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Executive Compensation in the Charitable Sector:
Beyond the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
Lauren Rogal*
This Article examines charity executive compensation in light of the
reforms enacted by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. Charities receive
preferential tax treatment under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code because they provide humanitarian, educational, and other services
that benefit the public. The payment of excessive compensation undermines
the policy purpose of charitable tax status by diverting resources from the
public good to private gain. The costs are borne by the intended charitable
beneficiaries, the subsidizing taxpayers, and the charitable sector as a
whole, which requires public confidence to sustain its work.
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act reformed charity compensation laws for
the first time in decades, imposing an excise tax on compensation over $1
million. With its enactment, there are now three legal constraints on
charity compensation that together provide piecemeal accountability. This
Article deconstructs the three mechanisms, assessing their enforceability
and metrics for appropriate compensation. It argues that the excise tax is
the mechanism best tailored to the goals of Section 501(c)(3), but that it is
impaired by a blunt and arbitrary metric. This Article then explores
alternative metrics that may better align with the policy objectives of
501(c)(3) status and proposes avenues for further investigation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (“TCJA”) reformed charity
executive compensation for the first time in decades, introducing an acrossthe-board excise tax on compensation over $1 million.1 Its enactment
represents a significant step toward securing accountability for the use of
the charitable tax exemption under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code. These organizations receive preferential tax treatment to
subsidize their provision of socially beneficial outputs that would otherwise
be undersupplied. Overcompensation of charity executives subverts this
purpose by diverting those subsidies for private gain and undermining
public confidence in the charitable sector.
With the enactment of the TCJA, federal tax law now offers three
mechanisms to constrain charity executive compensation. This Article
examines each mechanism with regard to its metric for gauging appropriate
compensation and its enforceability. The first mechanism is mandatory
public disclosure of compensation arrangements, which in theory facilitates
donor-imposed accountability. In practice, however, donors seldom have
adequate information, incentives, and market power to police
compensation. The second mechanism is regulatory enforcement against
individual charities that overcompensate executives. This tool relies on
weak metrics for appropriate compensation and resource-intensive
investigations. The third mechanism is the TCJA’s blanket excise tax on
the most generous compensation packages. This is a potentially effective
and easily administered tool, but it too applies an arbitrary metric for
appropriate compensation. Together, these mechanisms provide some
piecemeal accountability but are poorly tailored to the goals of the
charitable tax exemption.
The lack of an effective regulatory framework both permits some
charities to pay exorbitant salaries2 and obscures the extent of the
overcompensation problem. While there is reason to believe that
overcompensation is confined to a small minority of charities,3 this is
difficult to confirm without effective oversight. Moreover, while abuse

1

I.R.C. § 4960(a)(1) (2018).
2014 Charity CEO Compensation Study, CHARITY NAVIGATOR 1 (Oct. 2014),
https://www.charitynavigator.org/docs/2014_CEO_Compensation_Study.pdf
(defending
compensation in the sector generally, while conceding that some salaries are clearly “out-ofline”).
3
In 2014, the median CEO compensation at charities with over $1 million in revenues
was $123,462. 2016 Charity CEO Compensation Study, CHARITY NAVIGATOR 11 (Oct.
2016), https://d20umu42aunjpx.cloudfront.net/2016+CEO+Comp+Study/2016+CEO+Comp
ensation+Study.pdf.
2
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may be rare, it generates media headlines4 that harm public confidence in
the charitable sector. In a 2015 public opinion survey, 41% of respondents
indicated that nonprofit leaders are paid too much.5 Among the 35% who
reported little or no confidence in the charitable sector, salaries and other
spending were a major concern.6 Because charities rely on indirect
subsidies, which accrue only to the extent that the public provides financial
support, a perception of profligacy may inflict long-term damage to the
sector.7 This trend reinforces the need for effective regulation of executive
compensation.
This Article proceeds in seven parts. Part II introduces the charitable
sector and the underlying policy objectives of the charitable tax exemption.
Part III reviews the literature on determinants of executive compensation in
both the for-profit and nonprofit sectors. Parts IV, V, and VI examine the
three legal constraints on charity compensation in turn, assessing their
metrics and enforceability. Part VII reviews options for further reform,
focused on improving the metric for reasonable compensation that could be
enforced through the TCJA’s excise tax.
II. THE CHARITABLE SECTOR
The United States has over 1.4 million charities,8 ranging from
churches and schools to philanthropic foundations and neighborhood
organizations. Part II.A explains the general requirements and scope of the
charitable tax exemption. Part II.B surveys the scholarship on policy
rationales for the exemption.

4

See, e.g., Nonprofit? She Gets Paid $761,560 to Run This Domestic Violence Group,
MIAMI HERALD (July 26, 2018), https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2018/07/2
6/nonprofit-she-gets-paid-761560-to-run-this-domestic-violence-group/.
5
Suzanne Perry, 1 in 3 Americans Lacks Faith in Charities, Chronicle Poll Finds,
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/1-in-3-Americ
ans-Lacks-Faith/233613.
6
Id.
7
The number of households that donate to charity declined about 11% from 2000 to
2014. The difference was made up by a small number of wealthy donors, but this trend may
not be sustainable in the long term. Patrick M. Rooney, The Growth in Total Household
Giving Is Camouflaging a Decline in Giving by Small and Medium Donors: What Can We
Do About It?, NONPROFIT Q. (Aug. 27, 2019), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2018/11/21/tot
al-household-growth-decline-small-medium-donors/.
8
This figure includes 1,111,318 I.R.S.-registered 501(c)(3) organizations and roughly
350,000 churches, which are not required to file with the I.R.S. Because some churches opt
to register, the total figure likely counts some charities twice. Tax Exempt Organization
Search, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://apps.irs.gov/app/eos/ (last updated Sept. 6, 2019);
U.S. Religion Census 2010: Summary Findings, ASSOC’N STATISTICIANS AM. RELIGIOUS
BODIES 5 (2012), http://www.usreligioncensus.org/press_release/ACP%2020120501.pdf.
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A. Exemption Standards and Scope
The charitable sector encompasses a broad range of organizations
described in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.9 This
provision affords federal income tax exemption to entities that are
“organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster
national or international amateur sports competition . . . , or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals[.]”10 The Department of
Treasury regulations relax the statutory criteria somewhat, requiring
charities to operate primarily (rather than exclusively) for exempt purposes
and allowing them to pursue an “insubstantial” amount of non-exempt
activities.11 The Code also forbids charities to engage in any political
campaign activities or more than an insubstantial amount of legislative
lobbying.12 Finally, the Code prohibits any inurement of charities’ net
earnings to shareholders or other insiders.13 This provision effectively
requires charities to have a nonprofit legal structure and limits their
executive compensation to reasonable levels.14
There are two subcategories of charities. “Public charities” directly
serve and receive support from the general public. This status is available
to organizations that (i) fall into a statutory category of archetypal charities,
such as churches and schools;15 (ii) receive a significant portion of their
financial support from the general public;16 or (iii) operate for the purpose
of financially supporting another public charity.17 A 501(c)(3) organization
that does not qualify for public charity status is automatically classified as a
“private foundation.”18 Private foundations comprise less than ten percent
9

I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018).
Id. Regulations have further defined each of the exempt purposes listed in Section
501(c)(3). For example, “charitable” is expansively construed to include such purposes as
“[r]elief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged . . . erection or maintenance of
public [structures] . . . eliminat[ing] prejudice and discrimination . . . [and] combat[ting]
community deterioration and juvenile delinquency.” Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2)
(2019).
11
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1).
12
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
13
Id.
14
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2). See Part V for a discussion of the relationship
between private inurement and executive compensation. The IRS recognizes limited
liability companies as exempt under Section 501(c)(3) when certain conditions are met,
including that all members be Section 501(c)(3) organizations or public entities. Richard A.
McCray & Ward L. Thomas, B. Limited Liability Companies as Exempt Organizations –
Update, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (2001), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicb01.pdf.
15
I.R.C. §§ 509(a)(1); 170(b)(1)(A).
16
Id. § 509(a)(2)(A).
17
Id. § 509(a)(3).
18
Id. § 509(a).
10

ROGAL (DO NOT DELETE)

454

11/18/2019 4:54 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:449

of the charitable sector and typically disburse grants as their primary
activity, though some also conduct direct charitable programs.19 Because
private foundations are generally funded and governed by a small group of
connected individuals, they are considered less accountable to the public
and therefore subject to stricter regulations.20
Obtaining recognition as a Section 501(c)(3) organization confers
several tax advantages.21 In addition to avoiding federal income tax,
charities are the only category of exempt organization authorized to receive
tax-deductible donations.22 Individuals who itemize their deductions may
deduct up to fifty percent of their taxable income as charitable
contributions, while corporations may deduct up to ten percent.23 This
fundraising advantage makes Section 501(c)(3) a coveted status for
nonprofit organizations, which cannot raise capital through equity
investment. Finally, recognized charities may also be eligible for
exemption from certain state taxes.24
The exemption is not absolute. Charities must pay taxes when they
engage in certain non-exempt activities and transactions. The unrelated
business income tax (“UBIT”), for example, applies regular corporate tax
rates to charity earnings from commercial activities.25 Charities may also
incur excise taxes on lobbying expenditures.26 Finally, certain private
19

As of September 2019, there were 108,131 private foundations and 7,678 private
operating foundations registered with the I.R.S. Tax Exempt Organization Search,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://apps.irs.gov/app/eos/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2019). Private
operating foundations are foundations that expend most of their resources directly
conducting charitable activities. I.R.C. § 4942(j)(3). Private operating foundations are
subject to somewhat different rules than nonoperating foundations, but these distinctions do
not affect executive compensation.
20
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 4940 (imposing excise taxes on foundation investment income); §
4942 (imposing excise taxes on a foundation’s failure to distribute 5% of its assets
annually), § 4943 (imposing excise taxes on foundations that own a substantial portion of a
business), § 4944 (imposing excise taxes on foundations that make risky investments), §
4945 (imposing excise taxes on foundations that expend funds in violation of private
foundation rules).
21
Most organizations must apply for recognition under Section 501(c)(3), though there
are exceptions for churches, certain church affiliates, and organizations with less than
$5,000 in annual revenue. I.R.C. § 508(a)-(c).
22
Id. § 170(a).
23
Id. §§ 170(b)(1)(A); 170(b)(2)(A). The deductible percentage for individuals
typically depends on whether the recipient is classified as a public charity or a private
foundation.
24
See, e.g., TEX. CODE ANN. §§ 151.310(a)(2) (West 2019) (sales, use, and excise tax
exemption), 171.063(a)(1) (franchise tax exemption); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23701d(a)
(West 2019) (corporate income and franchise tax exemption); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-401.5
(West 2019) (income tax exemption), 58.1-609.11.B (sales and use tax exemption).
25
I.R.C. § 512. UBIT applies to net income from a trade or business that is regularly
carried on and not substantially related to the organization’s exempt purposes.
26
Public charities must pay tax on lobbying expenditures in excess of a formula-based
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foundations and universities must pay tax on their net investment income.27
These exceptions restrict charities from exploiting their tax-exempt status
to compete with for-profit businesses, exercise political power, or
accumulate unutilized wealth. In short, the exceptions help to ensure that
the scope of the exemption aligns with its policy rationale, explored below.
B. Policy Basis for the Charitable Exemption
Although charities have enjoyed tax-exempt status under every
revenue law since Congress first imposed peacetime corporate taxes in the
late nineteenth century,28 the legislative record sheds little light on the
rationale for the exemption.29 Because tax exemption for religious and
educational institutions has ancient historical roots, Congress may have
considered the rationale so self-evident as to not require an explanation.30
Scholars have stepped into this void with a range of theories
purporting to explain the exemption. They draw primarily on economics,
but occasionally introduce factors such as altruism, pluralism, and critical
race theory.31 The dominant perspective is that the exemption exists to
subsidize and encourage private sector provision of positive social outputs
that would otherwise be undersupplied.32 The Supreme Court stated the
threshold amount. Id. § 4911(a). Private foundations must pay tax on all lobbying
expenditures. Id. § 4945(d)(1).
27
Id. § 4940(a)-(e) (imposing a tax of up to 2% the net investment income of private
foundations that are not exempt operating foundations); id. § 4968(a) (imposing a tax of
1.4% on the net investment income of many private colleges and universities).
28
The Revenue Act of 1894 provided that “nothing contained herein shall apply to . . .
corporations, companies, or associations organized and conducted solely for charitable,
religious, or educational purposes . . .” Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509. It
was short-lived, however. The following year, the Supreme Court invalidated the corporate
tax on constitutional grounds. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637
(1895). Following the 1913 ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, which permits income
taxation, Congress reenacted a revenue code with exempt status for certain charitable
organizations. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G), 38 Stat. 114,
172.
29
Boris I. Bittker & Georget K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations
from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 302, 304 (1976) (noting that the enacting
Congress “devoted little discussion” to the matter and concluding that “legislative history of
the tax exemption reveals no systematic analysis”).
30
See John W. Whitehead, Tax Exemption and Churches: A Historical and
Constitutional Analysis, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 521 (1992) for an overview of tax exemption for
religious institutions from ancient civilizations to the present day.
31
For excellent synopses of these theories, see David A. Brennen, A Diversity Theory
of Charitable Tax Exemption – Beyond Efficiency, Through Critical Race Theory, Toward
Diversity, 4 PITT. TAX REV. 1 (2006); Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income
Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L.
REV. 419 (1998); Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for
Charities: Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395 (1997).
32
Atkinson, supra note 31, at 405.
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rationale as follows:
Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt
entity confers a public benefit—a benefit which the society or
the community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or
which supplements and advances the work of public institutions
already supported by tax revenue. History buttresses logic to
make clear that, to warrant exemption under § 501(c)(3) an
institution must fall within a category specified in that section
and must demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the
public interest.33
In short, charities provide outputs that Congress has deemed
beneficial to society.34 Some of these outputs are classic public goods: they
are non-rivalrous, meaning that one person’s consumption does not detract
from another’s, and non-excludable, meaning that anyone can access the
good regardless of whether they have paid for it.35 Pure public goods are
rare, but may include outputs such as public radio and clean air. Nonrivalry and non-excludability create a strong incentive for individuals to
freeride, consuming public goods without contributing to their
production.36 In competitive markets, freeriding means that public goods
will be underfunded and therefore supplied at less than socially optimal
levels.37
Similar logic applies to quasi-public goods, which have characteristics
of both public and private goods, and private goods with positive
externalities, such as education and healthcare.38 Most charity outputs fall
into these categories. Because their marginal societal benefit exceeds their
marginal private benefit, private purchasing decisions will not generate the
optimal level of output.39
Governments can mitigate this market failure by directly providing
undersupplied goods or subsidizing private suppliers. Subsidies may be
direct, in the form of public spending, or indirect, in the form of
preferential tax treatment.40 While direct subsidies are more efficient than
33

Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591–92 (1983).
Id. In addition to aligning with the permissible statutory purposes, charities must
comport with established public policy. Id. at 591.
35
Tyler Cowen, Public Goods and Externalities: Old and New Perspectives, in PUBLIC
GOODS AND MARKET FAILURES: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 3 (Tyler Cowen ed., 1988).
36
Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1215–16 (2010)
[hereinafter Keep Charity Charitable].
37
Id. at 1216.
38
Brian Galle, The Role of Charity in a Federal System, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 777,
787–88 (2012) [hereinafter The Role of Charity]; Keep Charity Charitable, supra note 36, at
1216 n.8.
39
Keep Charity Charitable, supra note 36, at 1216.
40
This preferential tax treatment includes both the exemption and the deduction.
34
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indirect subsidies, scholars have suggested reasons to prefer indirect
subsidization.
First, indirect subsidization allocates the cost
disproportionately to those persons who most value the outputs (i.e.
donors).41 Second, having taxpayers select the subsidized organizations
through their donations builds civic engagement.42 Third, the indirect
approach may help to ensure that subsidies reach minority groups that
would not have enough political power to compete for direct subsidies.43
In order to realize these advantages, members of the public must provide
funds to suppliers and, therefore, must have some degree of confidence in
their performance.
According to Professor Hansmann, this need for public confidence
explains why the subsidies are reserved for nonprofit organizations, even
though for-profit companies are, at least in theory, equally capable of
producing charitable outputs.44 Hansmann identified the hallmark of
nonprofit organizations as the “nondistribution constraint,” which
precludes the dissemination of net earnings to owners, managers, or other
insiders.45 The nondistribution constraint helps to alleviate three “contract
failures” in the delivery of charitable outputs.46 Each contract failure
impairs the ability of funders—whether donors or purchasers—to monitor
the quality or quantity of outputs, allowing for-profit suppliers to divert
Daniel E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531, 552–53
(2006) (“In Congress, the courts, the media, and now academia . . . the deduction is widely
viewed as a government subsidy . . . .”).
41
See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74
VA. L. REV. 1393, 1399–1406 (1988).
42
See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives,
Information, and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 229 (2009); Saul
Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 405 (1998). Detractors point out,
however, that the exemption only benefits those organizations that have positive net
revenues and therefore less need for subsidization than those that merely break even or
operate at a loss. Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit
Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307, 355–57
(1991).
43
Hall & Colombo, supra note 42, at 392–93.
44
See generally Henry B. Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit
Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L. J. 54 (1981) [hereinafter
Rationale]; Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980)
[hereinafter Role of Nonprofit Enterprise]. Other scholars have supplemented or slightly
revised Hansmann’s theory of contract failure, but it remains the prevailing rationale for
restricting charitable tax-exempt status to nonprofits. For example, Daniel Shaviro added
the insight that certain nonprofits, particularly those with a “virtuous or public-spirited
halo,” attract altruistically motivated workers, whom purchasers can trust to perform even
without close monitoring. Daniel Shaviro, Assessing the “Contract Failure” Explanation
for Nonprofit Organizations and Their Tax-Exempt Status, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1001,
1003–04 (1997) (conceding that he differs with Hansmann “in little beyond emphasis”).
45
Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 838.
46
Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 845.
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funds to their shareholders.47
The first contract failure affects donation-funded charitable
activities.48 Because donors generally do not consume the outputs of their
donations, they have difficulty monitoring the quality of those outputs.49
The second contract failure arises in the case of public goods.50 While
some people may be inclined to fund public goods out of beneficence or the
prospect of reputational benefits, the non-rivalrous quality of public goods
makes it difficult for funders to monitor whether their contributions
actually increase output.51 The third contract failure involves the provision
of “complex personal services,” such as education and healthcare.52 While
individuals often purchase these services for their own consumption, most
are not sophisticated enough to cost-effectively assess the quality of the
services they receive.53 These contract failures give for-profit suppliers
latitude to shirk on the provision of charitable outputs in favor of
distributing greater profits to their shareholders.
In order for indirect subsidization to succeed, suppliers must have
structural safeguards to prevent the misappropriation of resources for
private gain. The nonprofit structure, with its nondistribution constraint,
provides assurance that resources are not siphoned to owners through
dividend payments.54 Yet nonprofits can still divert resources into private
hands by extravagantly compensating their executives. Part III examines
the economic and organizational dynamics that facilitate executive
overcompensation.

47

Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 843.
Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 846.
49
Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 847.
50
Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 850.
51
Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 850–851.
52
Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 862–66.
53
Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 872.
54
Hansmann believes tax subsidies are necessary to offset the fact that the nonprofits
cannot raise equity capital. In this sense, Hansmann has the exemption flowing from the
preference for nonprofit provision of services, rather than the other way around. Rationale,
supra note 44, at 74–75. Detractors have pointed out that tax exemption confers the greatest
benefits to the charities with the most capital. Hall & Colombo, supra note 42, at 388.
Indeed, Hansmann concedes that his theory is a particularly poor fit for the case of nonprofit
hospitals, which are often flush with capital. Rationale, supra note 44, at 87. A simpler
explanation is that the subsidizing government does not wish its subsidies to be diverted to
shareholders. Atkinson, supra note 31, at 406.
48
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III. THE DYNAMICS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Executive compensation has been the focus of extensive scholarship,55
much of it seeking to explain the dramatic increase in C-Suite pay over the
past several decades.56 One study found that inflation-adjusted CEO
compensation rose nearly 1000% from 1978 to 2015.57 Compensation in
the nonprofit sector has risen at a slower pace overall, but jumped sharply
among the highest-paid executives.58 Part III reviews the literature on the
determinants of executive compensation. Part III.A examines research on
the for-profit sector, which primarily uses public company data and is far
more extensive than nonprofit compensation scholarship. Part II.B
discusses how dynamics evident in for-profit businesses appertain to the
charitable sector.
A. Theories of Executive Compensation
There are two dominant theoretical perspectives in the literature on
executive compensation in the for-profit sector.59 Optimal contracting
theory puts faith in the arms-length bargaining process between selfinterested companies and executives. Managerial power theory disputes
the fairness and efficiency of that process, deriding market failures that
result in excessive pay. This Part discusses both theories in turn, but begins
by summarizing the agency principles that underpin them.
Agency theory instructs that business principals (i.e. investors)
appoint agents (i.e. executives) to serve their interests and relieve them of
their immediate stewardship responsibilities.60 But the interests of
principal and agent are misaligned in various ways.61 First, self-interested
55
For a review, see Cynthia E. Devers et al., Executive Compensation: A
Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments, 33 J. MGMT. 1016–72 (2007).
56
Lawrence Mishel & Jessica Schieder, CEO Compensation Grew Faster Than the
Wages of the Top .01 Percent and the Stock Market, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Jul. 13, 2016),
http://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-compensation-grew-faster-than-the-wages-of-the-top-01-percent-and-the-stock-market/.
57
Id.
58
Andrea Fuller, Charity Officials Are Increasingly Receiving Million-Dollar Paydays,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/charity-officials-are-increasinglyreceiving-million-dollar-paydays-1488754532.
59
See, e.g., Pete Woodlock & Sheen Liu, Two Views of CEO Compensation: Part of
the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 2 J. THEORETICAL ACCT. RES. 52 (2007); Michael B.
Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the Other? Testing the Managerial Power and Optimal
Contracting Theories of Executive Compensation, 30 J. CORP. L. 255, 258 (2005).
60
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976)
(defining an agency relationship as a “contract under which one or more persons (the
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf
which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent”).
61
Id.
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executives have an incentive to shirk their duties or mobilize company
resources for personal gain rather than investor profit.62 Second, because
executives’ human and reputational capital is disproportionately invested in
one company, they tend to be more risk-averse than the diversified
investors.63 The divergence of interests forces principals to monitor their
agents, but effective oversight is impeded by resource constraints,
coordination problems among the principals, and information asymmetries
between the principals and agents. As a result, companies incur a residual
loss, which is simply a deadweight loss to principal welfare.64 Agency
costs65 increase as enterprises expand and investors appoint intermediaries
(i.e. directors or managers) to select and monitor executives on their
behalf.66
The traditional perspective on executive compensation, optimal
contracting theory, maintains that competitive market pressures produce
efficient compensation arrangements.67 Boards negotiate with executives
at arm’s length and determine the minimum compensation necessary to
procure their services.68 In order to more closely align executive and
shareholder interests, boards may issue performance-based compensation
in the form of equity grants, options, or contingent cash payouts.69
Performance-based compensation causes executives to internalize the
consequences of company performance, motivating them to take more
risk70 and work harder than they otherwise might.71
62

Id. at 312; Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL.
ECON. 288, 296 (1980).
63
See Henry T.C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to
Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1351 (2007) (“Managers of healthy companies
generally prefer taking less risk than they would if they were acting in the interests of their
presumptively diversified shareholders. A shareholder has shares in many companies; a
manager has only one job.”) (footnote omitted).
64
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 60, at 308–10.
65
Jensen and Meckling identify three components of agency cost: (1) monitoring costs
by the principal; (2) bonding costs, which include any costs that the principal requires the
agent to expend in order to minimize the risk of agent malfeasance; and (3) the “residual
loss” from divergence between principal and agent interests that monitoring and bonding
cannot neutralize. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 60, at 308.
66
Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, If So, What If Anything
Should Be Done About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1016 (2009).
67
Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 762 (2002) [hereinafter Managerial
Power]; Dorff, supra note 59, at 258.
68
Dorff, supra note 59, at 261.
69
David I. Walker, Evolving Executive Equity Compensation and the Limits of Optimal
Contracting, 64 VAND. L. REV. 611, 618 (2011).
70
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, several commentators condemned equity
compensation packages that rewarded short-term over long-term gains and therefore
encouraged excessive risk taking. See generally, Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Financial
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Optimal contracting theorists are generally skeptical of claims that
executives are overcompensated.72 Instead, they attribute skyrocketing
executive pay to the scarcity of talent and the increasing complexity of
management duties.73
Moreover, because equity compensation
concentrates a significant portion of executives’ investment portfolios in
one company, it is reasonable—necessary, even—to provide an additional
cash premium to offset this non-diversification burden.74 This dynamic,
optimal contracting theorists claim, explains the simultaneous surge in
equity and salary compensation over the past two decades.75
The main rival to optimal contracting theory is managerial power
theory, promulgated most notably by Harvard professors Lucian A.
Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried.76 Managerial power theory attributes the
boom in executive compensation not to market forces, but rather to rent
extraction by entrenched executives.77 Rents refer to private gains without
a corresponding creation of value – in this context, to compensation that is
not warranted by performance.78
Rent extraction is effectively a
redistribution of wealth from shareholders to executives.79
Crisis and Bank Executive Incentive Compensation, 25 J. CORP. FIN. 313, 341 (2014);
Lucian A. Bebchuk, How to Fix Bankers’ Pay, 139 DAEDALUS 52, 60 (2010). However, the
conventional concern has been that executives will behave more conservatively than
shareholders’ interests dictate. Walker, supra note 69, at 621 n.24.
71
In larger firms, managerial slack is generally considered a lesser concern than risk
aversion. Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregg D. Polsky, The Diminishing Returns of Incentive
Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677, 689 (2011) (noting
that “even the most strident incentive pay proponents do not suppose that, absent incentive
pay, there would be large-scale loafing going on in corner offices”); Iman Anabtawi,
Explaining Pay Without Performance: The Tournament Alternative, 54 EMORY L.J. 1557,
1592 (2005) (“[Executives] have survived multiple rounds of weeding out of individuals
with any appreciable taste for slack and have self-selected or become acculturated to hard
work.”).
72
See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Top Executives Are Worth Every Nickel They Get, 64
HARV. BUS. REV. 125 (1986).
73
Dorff, supra note 59, at 262.
74
Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 3, 5 (2002) (showing that the cost of options to shareholders “significantly
exceeds the value of the option from the perspective of a risk-averse, undiversified
executive who can neither sell the option nor hedge against its risk”).
75
Id.
76
See generally Managerial Power, supra note 67; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M.
Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71 (2003)
[hereinafter Agency Problem]; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without
Performance: Overview of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647 (2005) [hereinafter Overview];
LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2004).
77
See generally Managerial Power, supra note 67.
78
Robert D. Tollison, The Economic Theory of Rent Seeking, 152 PUB. CHOICE 73, 74
(2012). Profits, in contrast, refer to gains from the efficient allocation of resources. Id.
79
Dean Baker, The Upward Redistribution of Income: Are Rents the Story?, CTR. FOR
ECON. AND POL’Y RES. 13 (2015), http://cepr.net/documents/working-paper-upward-
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Managerial power theory attributes executive rent extraction to
failures of corporate governance. In part, this takes the form of an implicit
quid pro quo between directors and executives.80 Executives can reward
cooperative directors in a variety of ways, including by recommending
higher board compensation, providing social and professional connections,
and ensuring that they are re-nominated to their lucrative positions.81
Procedural and psychological factors also facilitate rent extraction.82 Board
decisions are largely based on information provided by the executives
themselves.83 Directors also tend to be wealthy, which distorts their
perception of reasonable compensation,84 and have “a natural psychological
tendency to believe that the high salaries of corporate executives accurately
reflect executives’ intrinsic worth.”85
To bolster the legitimacy of their compensation packages, companies
often task independent compensation consultants and committees with
recommending compensation levels based on market-rate metrics.86
Managerial power theorists are quick to point out that this has done little to
contain the rise in executive pay, because consultants and committee
members are just as influenced as directors by their desire for
reappointment.87 Companies cannot resolve managerial power dynamics
simply by outsourcing decisions.
Bebchuk and Fried identify shareholder “outrage” as the chief
constraint on executive compensation.88 Shareholders have several
avenues to express such outrage. First, they may vote to remove directors

distribution-income-rents.pdf. See also Catherine T. Jeppson et al., CEO Compensation and
Firm Performance: Is There Any Relationship?, 7 J. BUS. & ECON. RES. 81, 85 (2009)
(concluding that despite “a presumed strong relationship between CEO compensation and
firm performance, we did not find this to be the case”).
80
Agency Problem, supra note 76, at 73.
81
Overview, supra note 76, at 656–57; Agency Problem, supra note 76, at 73–74.
Median director compensation in 2015 was $258,000 per year, nearly double the 2000
figure. Sacha Pfeiffer & Todd Wallack, Few Hours, Soaring Pay for Corporate Board
Members, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/12/01/go
od-work-you-can-get-corporate-directors-among-highest-paid-part-time-employeesamerica/rYHPP7ozPXU0AG8VSo37MM/story.html?p1=Article_Related_Box_Article.
82
Posner, supra note 66, at 1023.
83
Managerial Power, supra note 67, at 772.
84
Charles A. O’Reilly III & Brian G.M. Main, Economic and Psychological
Perspectives on CEO Compensation: A Review and Synthesis, 19 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE
675, 686 (2010).
85
Posner, supra note 66, at 1023 (footnote omitted).
86
Agency Problem, supra note 76, at 78.
87
Agency Problem, supra note 76, at 79; Bernice Grant, Independent Yet Captured:
Compensation Committee Independence After Dodd-Frank, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 761, 777–83
(2014).
88
Agency Problem, supra note 76, at 75.
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whom they believe have overcompensated executives.
Second,
shareholders have also initiated derivative suits claiming that the directors’
approval of certain compensation packages constitutes a fiduciary breach or
waste of corporate assets, though with decidedly mixed results.89 Finally,
the Securities and Exchange Commission often requires public companies
to obtain shareholder approval before issuing equity compensation,90 and
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires
periodic, non-binding shareholder votes on executive compensation.91
Companies unsurprisingly respond to shareholder outrage by scaling back
pay.92 Nevertheless, shareholder outrage has its own constraints. For
example, positive economic forecasts in the industry tend to diminish
outrage.93 Companies can also curtail outrage by obscuring the true value
of compensation through non-salary arrangements such as deferred
compensation, expense accounts and other perks, equity stakes, guaranteed
future consulting contracts, and exorbitant severance payments.94 It is
therefore atypical for shareholder outrage to serve as a strong bulwark
against executive rent extraction.
Scholars have empirically tested both optimal contracting and
managerial power theories with inconsistent results.95 A 2015 meta-study
of over 200 empirical research studies concluded that both optimal
contracting and managerial power factors influence compensation to
varying degrees and that the two theories “do not represent competing

89

See, e.g., Rubin v. Murray, 943 N.E.2d 949 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (upholding a
finding of fiduciary breach due to excessive compensation). In Delaware, such claims have
settled with the payment of plaintiff attorneys’ fees, but face high barriers to success at trial.
See, e.g. City of Plantation Police Officers’ Emp.’s Retirement Sys. v. Jeffries, No. 2:14-cv1380, 2014 WL 470400, at *8-9 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 30, 2014) (approving a settlement in a
derivative lawsuit claiming fiduciary breach and corporate waste, while noting that “[e]ven
if plaintiff were able to rebut the presumption created by the business judgment rule,
plaintiff’s claim for excessive compensation would nevertheless be difficult to prove” and
“plaintiff would also face significant hurdles in proving a breach of fiduciary duty”); In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d 906 A.2d 27
(Del. 2006).
90
In 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued a rule mandating that firms
listed on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ obtain shareholder approval of any
new equity compensation plans and material amendments to existing plans. Self-Regulatory
Organizations, SEC Release No. 34-48108, 2003 SEC LEXIS 1540 (June 30, 2003).
91
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1367, 1899 (2010). Section 951 of Dodd-Frank
amended the Securities Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2018).
92
Agency Problem, supra note 76, at 75–76.
93
Agency Problem, supra note 76, at 76.
94
Agency Problem, supra note 76, at 79–80.
95
Marc van Essen et al., Assessing Managerial Power Theory: A Meta-Analytic
Approach to Understanding the Determinants of CEO Compensation, 41 J. MGMT. 164, 166
(2015).

ROGAL (DO NOT DELETE)

464

11/18/2019 4:54 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:449

explanations but describe points on a continuum . . . .”96 In other words,
the compensation practices of many companies reflect a hybrid of marketbased forces and rent extraction.
B. Compensation in the Charitable Sector
Agency principles also apply, if not identically, to the charitable
sector. While charities have no shareholders, the board of directors has a
legal duty to steward the charity in furtherance of its exempt purposes.97
To that end, the board appoints executives and monitors their performance.
In certain respects, the charity principal and agent have more
convergence of interests than in the for-profit sector. They likely share a
commitment to the charity’s mission,98 and charity directors do not have an
equity stake in the charity that might drive a predilection for risk-taking.
Yet rational charity executives still have an incentive to shirk and
maximize their personal gain.99 They also have a disproportionate
investment of human and reputational capital in the charity compared to
directors, which may affect their preferences.100 The charity structure does
not, therefore, nullify the agency problem found in other organizations.
Charities have certain governance dynamics that Bebchuk and Fried
found to facilitate rent extraction in public companies. Charity executives
typically have influence in the compensation-setting process, directing the
flow of performance-related information to the board.101 Nonprofit
96
Id. at 187 (concluding after a regression of 219 studies that, “[m]anagerial power . . .
has an important influence over the pay-setting process, but optimal contracting
arrangements may also exist”). Bebchuk and Fried also concede that compensation is “likely
to be shaped both by market forces that push toward value-maximizing outcomes, and by
managerial influence[.]” Agency Problem, supra note 76, at 73.
97
See, e.g. Summers v. Cherokee Children & Family Svcs., 112 S.W. 3d 486, 504
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (directors must be “principally concerned about the effective
performance of the nonprofit’s mission”); In re Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v.
Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 595 (N.Y. Sup. 1999) (a nonprofit board must “in the first
instance, seek to preserve its [. . .] mission.”). While nonprofit organizations do not have
shareholders, they may have “members” who elect or appoint directors. In such cases, the
members would function as principals in the agency relationship.
98
In a 2015 survey, 86% of nonprofit directors reported that they joined their
respective boards “to serve the organization and contribute to its success.” Only one quarter
reported being motivated by the prospect of furthering personal or professional interests.
2015 Survey on Board of Directors of Nonprofit Organizations, STAN. GRADUATE SCH. BUS.
& ROCK CTR. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE 7 (2015), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/file
s/publication-pdf/cgri-survey-nonprofit-board-directors-2015.pdf.
99
Brian Galle & David I. Walker, Nonprofit Executive Pay as an Agency Problem:
Evidence from U.S. Colleges and Universities, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1881, 1895–96 (2014).
100
For example, directors may favor a merger that will bolster charitable impact,
whereas executives may object due to the risk to their position.
101
Even when charities take advantage of the legal safe harbor for executive
compensation arrangements (discussed in Part V), the executive may provide information
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leadership is highly homogenous,102 and directors have social and
professional ties to executives that may foster a culture of deference.103
These factors may contribute to overcompensation in the charity context
much as they do in public companies.
Moreover, certain aspects of the agency problem may be more
difficult to address in the charitable sector than in the for-profit sector.
First, charity principals have additional barriers to monitoring performance.
They nearly always serve on a volunteer basis,104 which may deprioritize
their charity duties relative to their other professional obligations. They
may also have a more difficult task in assessing executive performance.
While for-profit companies can utilize the simple metric of profits as a
proxy for firm performance (and, by extension, executive success),
charitable impact is more nuanced and susceptible to distortion by a selfinterested executive.105
Second, while for-profit companies may try to align principal and
agent interests by issuing equity compensation, charities cannot do so
without violating the non-distribution constraint and prohibition on private
inurement.
Charities can offer non-equity forms of incentive
compensation, such as cash bonuses for achievement of certain
benchmarks, but only if the overall compensation remains reasonable and
the benchmarks denote individual performance.106 This makes it difficult
relevant to his or her compensation before recusing herself from board deliberations. See
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(1)(ii). While the regulations permit an executive to “answer
questions” from the board prior to deliberations, the I.R.S.’s sample conflict of interest
policy for charities provides broader latitude, allowing a conflicted person to “make a
presentation” before recusal. Instructions for Form 1023, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 26
(2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1023.pdf.
102
A 2017 survey found 84% of directors, 90% of chief executives and board chairs, are
white, and that 83% of directors are over 40. While the survey did not collect data on the
income levels of board members, it found that only 22% of chief executives and 39% of
board chairs are satisfied with their board’s level of socioeconomic diversity. Leading with
Intent: 2017 National Index of Nonprofit Board Practices, BOARDSOURCE 11 (2017),
https://leadingwithintent.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/LWI-2017.pdf.
103
Tivoni Devor, The Face of Nonprofit Boards: A Network Problem, NONPROFIT Q.
(Mar. 4, 2015), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/the-face-of-nonprofit-boards-a-network-probl
em/.
104
Approximately one percent of charities pay salaries or honoraria to board members,
though this increases among private foundations to three percent paying salaries and five
percent paying honoraria. Supra note 102, at 52.
105
Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity Law’s Essentials, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2
(2011) (“Accountability to mission is exceedingly difficult to measure and police.”); Linda
Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization of Nonprofit Governance: Transforming Obedience
into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893, 919 (2007) (“Measuring effectiveness may be the
most intractable problem that charities have: Because their goals rarely translate into
measurable returns, and are often long-term, there may be no way to measure success in a
timely way, or at all.”).
106
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991) (disallowing payment to
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to devise a compensation structure where executives internalize
organizational outcomes.
Finally, the major constraint against overcompensation in the forprofit sector, shareholder outrage, has no close analogue in the charitable
sector. The losers from overcompensation are not shareholders, but the
intended charitable beneficiaries.
Unlike shareholders, charitable
beneficiaries usually have no voting rights or standing to sue. Concerned
members of the public can refer charities to the I.R.S. by submitting a
complaint form, but it is unclear how often these are actually reviewed.107
The outrage constraint is therefore more likely to be imposed by donors,
who have the power to inflict financial pain in much the same way as
divesting shareholders.108 Yet, as Part IV explores in depth, even donors
are much less equipped than shareholders are to monitor and respond to
compensation practices.
Because charities, like for-profit businesses, are susceptible to
executive rent seeking and other market distortions, there is a risk that these
subsidized organizations will misappropriate resources as executive
overcompensation. In order to safeguard the intent of the exemption, the
law offers several mechanisms to constrain executive compensation. Parts
IV, V, and VI explore these mechanisms and their effectiveness in
upholding the policy purposes of the charitable exemption.
IV. FIRST MECHANISM: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AND
DONOR MARKET ORDERING
The first constraint on compensation is mandatory public disclosure.
The availability of compensation data permits donors and other
stakeholders to withdraw their support from charities that extravagantly
compensate their executives, putting downward pressure on compensation
levels. Part IV.A details the disclosure rules. Part IV.B explains why, in
practice, transparency seldom leads to donor-based accountability.

physicians based on hospital or departmental earnings and contrasting the decision with that
of Rev. Rul. 69-383, which approved a compensation arrangement where a hospital paid a
radiologist a fixed percentage of his individual gross billings); World Family Corp. v.
Comm’r, 81 T.C. 958, 970 (1983) (approving the payment of commissions to individuals
based on the amount they personally procured for the organization and distinguishing the
instant case from situations where an individual received commissions based on total
fundraising regardless of personal performance); see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200601030
(Oct. 12, 2005); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9316052 (Jan. 29, 1993); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem.
39,670 (Oct. 14, 1987).
107
I.R.S. Complaint Process - Tax-Exempt Organizations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.
(last updated Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/irs-complaint-proces
s-tax-exempt-organizations.
108
Galle & Walker, supra note 99, at 1887.
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A. Overview of the Public Disclosure Regime
All charities, with the exception of certain religious and small
organizations, must file an annual informational return (Form 990) with the
I.R.S..109 Charity returns disclose the amount of compensation paid to (i)
current officers, directors, trustees, key employees, and highestcompensated employees;110 (ii) former directors and trustees who receive
more than $10,000 in their capacity as former directors or trustees; and (iii)
former officers, key employees, and highest-compensated employees who
currently receive more than $100,000 in any capacity.111 For each of these
listed individuals, the return must disclose the hours worked and the value
of reportable and non-reportable compensation paid by the charity and any
related organizations.112
Charities must submit a supplemental Schedule J for any listed
individuals who are former executives, who receive over $150,000 in
aggregate from the charity and related organizations, or who receive
compensation from unrelated parties for services rendered to the charity.113
Schedule J requires a detailed breakdown of the compensation components,
such as deferred and incentive compensation.114 It also requires disclosure
of lavish benefits such as first class travel, discretionary spending accounts,
and housing allowances.115
Finally, charities must explain the
compensation-setting process, including whether they use salary surveys
and independent decision-makers.116
Form 990 must be made available for public inspection upon
request.117 This requirement permits watchdog organizations to aggregate
and publish the returns of most charities on their websites in a searchable
format.118 They periodically generate reports revealing the most highly
109

I.R.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A) (2018).
Id. § 6033(b)(7); Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(a)(2)(ii)(h) (2019). A “key employee” is
one who (i) earns more than $150,000 in reportable compensation from the organization and
related organizations; (ii) has responsibilities resembling those of directors or officers, or
oversees ten percent or more of the organizational operations or budget; and (iii) is among
the highest-compensated twenty employees. Instructions for Form 990, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV. 65 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990.pdf.
111
Form 990, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 7 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/f990.pdf.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 8.
114
Schedule J Form 990, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 2 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-pdf/f990sj.pdf.
115
Id. at 1.
116
Id.
117
Treas. Reg. § 301.6104(b)-1(d)(1) (2019).
118
See GUIDESTAR USA, INC., https://www.guidestar.org (last visited Oct. 1, 2019);
CHARITY NAVIGATOR, https://www.charitynavigator.org (last visited Oct. 1, 2019).
110
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compensated charity executives.119 Many watchdogs also maintain a
ratings system for larger charities, complete with gold stars or other
accolades for high-rated organizations.120 These rating systems seldom
assess executive compensation per se, instead focusing on the ratio of
programmatic expenses to management and fundraising expenses.121 This
ratio comes directly from the Form 990, where charities must allocate each
expenditure line item among these categories.122 The I.R.S. instructions
indicate that executive salaries generally belong in the management
category, unless “a part of their time is spent directly supervising program
services or fundraising activities,” in which case the allocation should be
based on how the executives divide their time.123 This nebulous distinction
between program and management activities means that charities often
have some latitude to allocate executive compensation in a manner that
positively affects their ratings.124
B. Assessment of the Public Disclosure Regime
The public disclosure mechanism effectively appoints donor
perception as the metric of reasonable compensation. This conveniently
removes the thorny task of metric determination from the government’s
purview, but raises the normative question of whether donor perception is a

119
See Top Compensation Packages, CHARITY WATCH, https://www.charitywatch.org/to
p-charity-salaries (last visited Oct. 1, 2019).
120
Charity Navigator rates organizations with at least $1 million in revenues on a 100point scale. It gives charities up to four stars based on a 100-point rating system, but will
only rate charities that meet longevity, revenue, public support, and other criteria. Charity
Navigator’s Methodology, CHARITY NAVIGATOR, https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cf
m?bay=content.view&cpid=5593 (last visited Oct. 18, 2019). Charity Watch focuses
charities with over $1 million in revenues that have been operating for at least three years.
It gives a letter grade to charities based on their financial efficiency. Frequently Asked
Questions, CHARITY WATCH, https://www.charitywatch.org/about-charitywatch/faq#charity
_selection (last visited Oct. 18, 2019); Our Charity Rating Process, CHARITY WATCH,
https://www.charitywatch.org/our-charity-rating-process (last visited Oct. 18, 2019).
121
Financial Score Conversions and Tables, CHARITY NAVIGATOR (last updated June 1,
2016), https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=48#Performan
ceMetricOne; Criteria & Methodology, CHARITYWATCH, https://www.charitywatch.org/abo
ut-charitywatch/criteria-methodology/3113/3147 (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).
122
Form 990, supra note 111, at 10.
123
Instructions for Form 990, supra note 110, at 42.
124
The Quality of Financial Reporting by Nonprofits: Findings & Implications, URBAN
INST. 1-2 (Aug. 2004), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/57736/311045The-Quality-of-Financial-Reporting-by-Nonprofits.PDF. The Urban Institute’s study of nine
organizations of all sizes found that, at most sites, “one or two staff members make a
retrospective judgment once per year about how everyone spent their time, and this is the
basis for the functional allocation of personnel costs” for the Form 990. Id. The report noted
that nonprofits are “responding to perceived and explicit pressure to keep real and reported
administrative and fundraising costs low.” Id.
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satisfactory barometer. Although donors disproportionately subsidize
charities through their contributions, non-donating taxpayers ultimately
subsidize charity compensation as well. Relying on donors to identify
overcompensation presumes that they can meaningfully stand in for the
interests of all taxpayers.
Donor market ordering also presents practical problems, since donor
backlash against overcompensation only materializes in the rare event of
mass media coverage.125 For example, donations to the Wounded Warrior
Project plummeted after the New York Times’s front-page exposé of
extravagant pay and other spending.126 Without media attention, however,
compensation practices have no statistically significant effect on
donations.127 The reasons for this non-effect can be broadly classified as
donor information deficits and donor outrage deficits.
Most donors have informational deficits with respect to charity
compensation. For small or unsophisticated donors, performing due
diligence is simply not cost-effective.128 Even donors who research the
compensation figures may have difficulty assessing whether they are
commensurate with the executives’ responsibilities and performance. As
Hansmann pointed out in his discussion of contract failures, donors seldom
have firsthand knowledge of operations.129 Donors may refer to charity
ratings, if available, but ratings usually do not dig deeper than the charity’s
reported expenditure breakdown. This information may be meaningful in
some cases, but in other cases may give acclaim to operations that spend
liberally but ineffectually. Often, a donor in search of information about
the charity’s mission outcomes must rely on annual reports and other
charity-generated publications, which may project a misleading image by
highlighting anecdotes over data, opportunistically selecting metrics, and
omitting caveats. These information deficits impair donors’ ability to
assess and react to compensation levels.
Outrage deficits mean that donors continue to contribute to charities
despite knowledge of lavish executive compensation. There are several
potential explanations for this. First, donors may not be troubled by
125
Steven Balsam & Erica E. Harris, The Impact of CEO Compensation on Nonprofit
Donations, 28 ACCT. REV. 425, 437 (2014) (showing a strong and statistically significant
negative correlation between media coverage of high compensation and subsequent
donations).
126
Dave Philipps, Helping Veterans Recover, Spending Lavishly on Itself, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 28, 2016, at A1; Mark Hrywna, Revenue, Program Spending Decline Again at
Wounded Warrior Project, NONPROFIT TIMES (Apr. 23, 2018), http://www.thenonprofittimes
.com/news-articles/revenue-program-spending-decline-wounded-warrior-project/.
127
Balsam & Harris, supra note 125, at 437.
128
Balsam & Harris, supra note 125, at 439.
129
Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 843.

ROGAL (DO NOT DELETE)

470

11/18/2019 4:54 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:449

overcompensation because, unlike in for-profits, it does not come at their
expense. Donors may not even mind the diversion of their resources from
the charitable mission if they are principally motivated by the promise of
public recognition, event invitations, or other perks.130 Second, donors
with a personal affinity for the charity (e.g. because it is their alma mater or
religious denomination) may be disinclined to reallocate their funding in
response to overcompensation. Third, large donors who balk at paying for
high executive compensation can simply require by contract that their
donations be allocated elsewhere. Fourth, wealthy donors may be more
inclined to perceive even very high compensation as reasonable. This
possibility has particular salience because charitable giving is increasingly
concentrated among high-income households, a trend that experts expect to
accelerate in light of the TCJA’s near doubling of the standard income tax
deduction.131 All of these factors can preclude donors from punishing
charities that overpay executives.
Despite the evidence that donors are generally unresponsive to
executive compensation levels, the disclosure requirement could still
constrain compensation by making charities wary of backlash from the
media or particularly scrupulous contributors. There is evidence that
religiously affiliated colleges and universities with small endowments
contain their compensation for fear of alienating donors.132 This finding
suggests a deterrent value to mandatory disclosure, but also highlights that
donor market ordering principally affects donor-dependent charities. Yet
for many charities, private giving accounts for a minority of overall
revenues.133 The other major sources of nonprofit revenue, government
grants and program fees, appear equally insensitive to compensation levels
in the absence of media attention.134 Some charities also enjoy funding

130
Rene Bekkers & Pamala Wiepking, A Literature Review of Empirical Studies of
Philanthropy: Eight Mechanisms That Drive Charitable Giving, 40 NONPROFIT &
VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 924, 934-37 (2011).
131
Charitable Giving and Tax Incentives, INDIANA U. LILLY FAM. SCH. PHILANTHROPY 6
(2019), https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/1805/19515/tax-policy190603.pdf?
sequence=4&isAllowed=y.
The increase is effective for eight years, until 2026, unless it is extended. Pub. L. 115-97,
131 Stat 2054
§ 11021(a) (2017).
132
Galle & Walker, supra note 99, at 1919.
133
Brice S. McKeever, The Nonprofit Sector in Brief 2015: Public Charities, Giving,
and Volunteering, URB. INST. 5 (Oct. 2015), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/non
profit-sector-brief-2015-public-charities-giving-and-volunteering. The data showed that,
among public charities, private charitable contributions comprised merely 13.3% of
revenues. This figure, however, is driven largely by universities and hospitals receiving a
high proportion of tuition payments, patient fees, and Medicaid and Medicare payments.
134
Balsam & Harris, supra note 125, at 441.
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from endowments and long-term institutional grants, and therefore do not
rely on ongoing donor goodwill.
Public disclosure as a mechanism to regulate charity executive
compensation relies on the judgment, motivation, and market power of
donors. Due to donor information and outrage deficits, transparency is
unlikely to operate as an effective check on executive compensation. The
weakness of market-based accountability reinforces the need for an
effective regulatory structure to ensure that compensation practices do not
subvert the purpose of the charitable tax exemption.
V. SECOND MECHANISM: REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
The second constraint on compensation is regulatory enforcement.
The Code directly prohibits private inurement and permits executives to
receive only reasonable compensation. Violations can result in substantial
financial penalties and/or the loss of tax-exempt status. Part V.A describes
the legal framework in depth. Part V.B examines the merits and
weaknesses of this mechanism.
A. Regulatory Enforcement Regime Overview
For over a century, Congress has conditioned charitable tax exemption
on the absence of private inurement.135 This term refers to the diversion of
charitable resources to individuals with “a personal and private interest in
the activities of the organization,”136 including executives.137 Inurement
may take a variety of forms, including loans with unusually lenient
terms,138 payment of inflated rent,139 and insider use of charity-owned
vehicles and housing.140 Early private inurement cases mostly dealt with

135
See, e.g., Corporate Tax Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 112 (1909); Revenue
Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 166 (1913). The prohibition on inurement also
expressly applies to nine of the twenty-seven other categories of exempt organizations.
I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), (4)(B), (6), (7), (8), (11)(A), (13), (19)(C), (26)(D), (29)(B)(ii) (2018).
Subsection (20) was repealed in 2014.
136
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-(1)(c) (2019).
137
The I.R.S. considers the rules on private inurement applicable to highly-paid
employees who are not directors or officers. See, e.g. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,498
(Apr. 24, 1986) (applying the inurement ban to hospital physicians); I.R.S. Gen. Couns.
Mem. 39,670 (Oct. 14, 1987) (applying the inurement ban to college athletic coaches). The
Tax Court, however, has repudiated the application of the inurement rules to mere
employees, opting instead to apply the private benefit doctrine. See, e.g. Senior Citizens of
Mo., Inc. v. Comm’r, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 480 (1988).
138
Orange Cty. Agr. Soc., Inc. v. Comm’r, 893 F.2d 529, 534 (2d Cir. 1990).
139
Tex. Trade Sch. v. Comm’r, 272 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1959).
140
Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197, 1201 (Ct. Cl.
1969).
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annuity payments to insiders,141 but by the 1940s and 1950s, regulators had
turned their attention to compensation as a potential source of inurement.142
The I.R.S. has articulated three factors relevant to whether
compensation arrangements violate the ban on inurement: (i) the
underlying purpose of the compensation; (ii) the process by which the
compensation was decided; and (iii) the reasonableness of the
compensation amount.143 Agency and court decisions consistently consider
these factors, but without any explicit balancing test or order of priority.
The first factor is whether the purpose of the compensation package is
to procure services or merely disguise the distribution of profits.144 This
can be inferred from the circumstances and structure of the compensation.
For example, a long-term contract that guarantees fixed compensation
irrespective of performance is considered a distribution of profits.145
Similarly, a significant increase in compensation without a commensurate
expansion of responsibilities is likely to be construed as a distribution of
profits.146
This inquiry calls for particular scrutiny of incentive
compensation structures that calculate pay based on financial
performance.147 For years, the I.R.S. vacillated between per se rejection
141
See, e.g., Lederer v. Stockton, 43 S. Ct. 5 (1922) (allowing an exemption despite the
payment of annuities); Scholarship Endowment Found. v. Nicholas, 106 F.2d 552 (10th Cir.
1939) (rejecting an exemption due to the payment of annuities); Orton v. C.I.R., 9 T.C. 533,
542 (1947) (allowing an exemption despite the payment of annuities where the “clear and
predominant purpose [is] to aid the charity and where the noncharitable benefits are
incidental to that purpose”).
142
See, e.g., Home Oil Mill v. Willingham, 68 F. Supp. 525, 529 (N.D. Ala. 1945)
(holding that a charitable trust’s payment of “reasonable and . . . fair” compensation to the
grantor’s sister in exchange for her active management of the trust did not defeat the
exemption), aff’d, 181 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852; Mabee Petroleum
Corp. v. United States, 203 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1953) (denying an exemption due to an
excessive fixed salary paid to the founder).
143
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,670 (Oct. 14, 1987); Rev. Rul. 69-383, 1969-2 C.B. 113
(articulating the three-factor test).
144
Rev. Rul. 69-383, 1969-2 C.B. 113.
145
Mabee, 203 F.2d at 876 (holding that the “purported salary payments were not
intended merely to compensate him for services to be rendered, but were really authorized
to assure him substantial distributions . . . in the form of salary”). The contract in question
had a term of fifteen years, which would have taken the executive to the age of eighty-two.
146
See, e.g., Founding Church of Scientology, 412 F.2d at 1201 (surmising that the
steady increase in L. Ron Hubbard’s compensation, which took the form of fees, loans, and
commissions as well as base salary, reflected Hubbard’s influence in the organization rather
than any growth in his responsibilities); Incorp. Trs. of the Gospel Worker Soc’y v. United
States, 510 F. Supp. 374, 379 (D.D.C. 1981), aff’d, 672 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982) (finding that 300%, 350%, and 600% increases in
compensation over eight years reflected the organization’s improved fundraising capacity
rather than an expansion of individual responsibilities).
147
People of God v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 127, 132 (1980) (holding in the case of a minister
who received a percentage of tithes, that “[w]hatever [the minister]’s services are worth,
they are not directly related to [the church]’s gross receipts; the value of solace and spiritual
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and conditional acceptance of such incentive structures.148 Since the 1980s,
however, it has generally accepted incentive arrangements that have a
predetermined ceiling149 and depend on individual achievement rather than
organizational or exogenous factors.150
The second factor focuses on how the compensation was determined.
The I.R.S. considers the number of decision-makers, their relationship to
the executive, and the bargaining process.
If the compensation
arrangement did not result from arms-length bargaining,151 the organization
leadership cannot be measured by the collection box”).
148
See, e.g. Rev. Rul. 69-383, 1969-2 C.B. 113 (permitting an exempt hospital to
compensate a radiologist with a percentage of departmental gross proceeds after
determining that the amount was reasonable and the arrangement was negotiated at arm’s
length); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,865 (Jun. 21, 1974) (deeming profit-sharing plans per
se inurement); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,180 (Jun. 24, 1977) (finding per se inurement in
a deferred compensation plan for hospital physicians that included payment of investment
gains and losses, even though the compensation amount and manner of adoption met I.R.S.
standards); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,283 (Feb. 15, 1980) (reversing the Service’s
previous position and concluding that incentive compensation in which profits are a factor
does not automatically constitute inurement); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,670 (1987)
(recognizing that deferred compensation may be invested without violating the inurement);
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,674 (Jun. 17, 1987) (allowing profit-sharing plans if they
otherwise satisfy a three-part test).
149
People of God, 75 T.C. at 132 (“By basing [the executive’s] compensation upon a
percentage of . . . gross receipts, apparently subject to no upper limit, a portion of [the
organization]’s earnings is being passed on” to the executive as private inurement.); I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201235021 (Jun. 4, 2012) (An organization pledged to pay twenty percent of
its donations to a related organization for technology and administrative services. The “lack
of cap limit entails that [a related company] can receive unlimited income that will more
than compensate [the company] for the services [it] renders to you.”); I.R.S. Gen. Couns.
Mem. 38,322 (Mar. 24, 1980) (compensating a trust administrator and general counsel with
a set percentage of contributions constituted inurement in part because “[n]o ceiling or
maximum payment was imposed on the amount of compensation”); I.R.S. Advisory Letter
2002-0021 (Jan. 9, 2002) (IRS advisory letter indicating that a ceiling on compensation is
one factor in determining whether a physician’s compensation amounts to inurement); see
also Instructions for Form 990, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 42 (2017),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/i990—2017.pdf (“The fact that a bonus or revenue-sharing
arrangement is subject to a cap is a relevant factor in determining the reasonableness of
compensation.”).
150
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991) (disallowing payment to
physicians based on hospital or departmental earnings and contrasting the decision with that
of Rev. Rul. 69-383, which approved a compensation arrangement where a hospital paid a
radiologist a fixed percentage of his individual gross billings); World Family Corp., 81 T.C.
at 970 (approving the payment of commissions to individuals based on the amount they
personally procured for the organization and distinguishing the instant case from situations
where an individual received commissions based on total fundraising regardless of personal
performance).
151
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,670 (Oct. 14, 1987); World Family Corp., 81 T.C. at
969 (“We must consider then whether a commission which may be reasonable when paid to
an unrelated third party becomes unreasonable when paid to an individual having a personal
and private interest in the payor organization. Although in some circumstances such a
finding may be warranted, it is clear that payment to an interested individual does not make
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may bear a higher burden of proof to demonstrate that the arrangement is
reasonable.152 The I.R.S. applies particular scrutiny to organizations
dominated by a single individual or small group of individuals.153
The third factor is the reasonableness of the compensation amount.154
Reasonableness is “purely a question of fact to be resolved in the light of
all the evidence.”155 For decades, decisions offered little consistent
reasoning or usable guidance on what constituted reasonable compensation,
except to suggest that insider pay should not consume all organizational
earnings.156 Some decisions referenced Section 162 of the Code, which
allows businesses a tax deduction for “reasonable . . . salaries or other
compensation for personal services actually rendered[.]”157 Under Section
162, reasonable compensation means the amount that would “ordinarily be
paid for like services by like enterprises under like circumstances.”158 In
1996, Congress effectively endorsed this definition when it legislated a safe
harbor for charities that could demonstrate their payment of fair market
value.159
Upon a finding of private inurement, the I.R.S. may revoke the
organization’s exempt status, but this is relatively rare. Between 2011 and
2013, the I.R.S. revoked the exempt status of fewer than 100 organizations

a commission unreasonable as a matter of law.”).
152
Orange Cty. Agr. Soc., Inc., 893 F.2d at 534 (“The burden of proof is on the taxpayer
to demonstrate that insiders do not benefit from the tax-exempt organization, especially
where the facts indicate transactions arguably not on arm’s length terms.”).
153
See, e.g., Bubbling Well Church of Universal Love, Inc. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 531,
535 (1980) (finding an “obvious opportunity for abuse” where a single family comprised the
entire voting board of directors and staff), aff’d, 670 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1981).
154
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,670 (Oct. 14, 1987).
155
Bubbling Well Church, 74 T.C. at 537–38.
156
In a number of cases, courts held that the organization had failed to provide adequate
justification for compensation that consumed a high proportion of earnings. See, e.g.,
Bubbling Well Church, 74 T.C. at 535; Church of the Transfiguring Spirit, Inc. v. Comm’r,
76 T.C. *1, *5-6 (1981); see also Brian Ruud Int’l v. United States, 733 F. Supp. 396, 402
(1989) (finding that compensation was reasonable in amount because it was “relatively
modest” compared to the organization’s earnings). Others deemed compensation reasonable
without further explanation. See, e.g., Saint Germain Found. v. Comm’r, 26 T.C. 648, 659
(1956) (finding the organization’s payment of personal living expenses in lieu of salary “to
be reasonable in every respect”).
157
See, e.g., Senior Citizens of Mo., Inc. v. Comm’r, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 480, 480 (1988);
Enter. Ry. Equip. Co. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 590, 595 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (referencing the
analogous section on business deductions of the previous internal revenue law).
158
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(3) (2019).
159
Interestingly, decisions had long cited fair market value as the determining factor in
whether the sale of assets created inurement, but this was not regularly applied to the
analysis of compensation. See, e.g., Anclote Psychiatric Ctr., Inc. v. Comm’r, 76 T.C.M.
(CCH) 175, at *9 (1998) (to avoid inurement, the price of assets sold to an insider must be
“within a reasonable range of what could be considered fair market values”).
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for private inurement and related problems.160 In lieu of, or in addition to,
revocation, the I.R.S. may impose potentially severe financial penalties for
excessive compensation. These penalties depend on whether the Code
characterizes the organization as a public charity or a private foundation.
1. Public Charities
Public charities that overcompensate their executives may be
penalized with “intermediate sanctions.”161 Enacted by Congress in 1996,
the intermediate sanctions regime allows the I.R.S. to penalize private
inurement without necessarily resorting to revocation of tax-exempt
status.162 Intermediate sanctions apply to any “excess benefit transaction”
between a public charity and a “disqualified person.”163 An excess benefit
transaction is one where “the value of the economic benefit provided
exceeds the value of the consideration (including the performance of
services) received for providing such benefit.”164 Consideration in this
context includes all forms of cash and noncash compensation, including
salary, fees, bonuses, severance, taxable fringe benefits, expense
allowances, below-market loans, and vested benefits under a qualified
pension, profit sharing, or stock bonus plan.165 Executives generally count
as disqualified persons,166 but the Code is primarily concerned with insider
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-164, TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
23 (2014) [hereinafter G.A.O. Report]. This figure includes revocations premised on both
private inurement and private benefit.
161
Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4958-2(a)(1); 53.4958-2(a)(2)(i) (excepting private foundations
from the intermediate sanctions rules).
162
Caracci v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 379, 417 (2002), rev’d on other grounds 456 F.2d 444
(5th Cir. 2006); H.R. REP. NO. 104-226, at 55 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1143,
1177–78 (explaining that before the enactment of intermediate sanctions to penalize private
inurement, the only sanction provided by law was revocation of the organization’s exempt
status).
163
I.R.C. § 4958(a)(1) (2018).
164
Id. § 4958(c)(1)(A).
165
Id.; Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4958-1(e)(2), 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii)(B).
166
I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1). Disqualified persons include “any person who was, at any time
during the five-year period ending on the date of such transaction, in a position to exercise
substantial influence over the affairs of the organization,” a family member of such a
person, or an entity that is at least thirty-five percent controlled by disqualified persons. Id.
The regulations simplify the disqualified person test by creating three categories. The first
category, consisting of the president, CEO, COO, CFO, treasurer, voting members of the
governing body, and others performing similar functions are automatically considered
disqualified persons. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(c). The second category, which includes
organizations exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Code and employees who receive less
than the I.R.S. indexed amount for “highly compensated employees,” and are not otherwise
considered disqualified persons, are automatically excluded from the definition of
disqualified persons. Id. § 53.4958-3(d)(1), (3). The third category encompasses all other
persons. In this catch-all category, all the facts and circumstances are considered in a
determination of whether a person is disqualified. Id. § 53.4958-3(e)(1).
160
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rent-seeking and exempts most new recruits from outside the
organization.167
Intermediate sanctions consist of two tiers of taxation on the excess
benefit amount.168 The initial tier is a twenty-five percent tax charged to
the disqualified person169 and a ten percent tax charged to each organization
manager who knowingly approved or acquiesced to the transaction.170 The
second tier—a 200% tax on the excess benefit amount, payable by the
disqualified person—applies if the charity does not correct the transaction
before the I.R.S. assesses the initial tax.171 Correction generally involves
reversing the transaction and restoring the charity to the position it would
have occupied had the transaction never occurred.172 If the charity
indemnifies the disqualified person or managers against intermediate
sanctions, the I.R.S. will consider the amount of the indemnity to be
additional compensation.173
Charities that follow certain procedures are entitled to a rebuttable
presumption that their transactions do not confer an excess benefit.174
These procedures are: (i) approval by disinterested decision-makers; (ii)
use of comparative data demonstrating that the transaction is market-rate;
and (iii) concurrent documentation of the decision.
First, the board (or a board-authorized committee) must approve the
compensation in advance by a vote of its disinterested members.175
Members must recuse themselves if they (i) will participate in or may
economically benefit from the transaction; (ii) are in an employment
relationship subject to the control of another disqualified person
participating in or economically benefiting from the transaction; (iii)
167

Id. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(i). The intermediate sanctions regime does not apply to fixed
payments made pursuant to an initial contract so long as the compensated individual
substantially performs his or her obligations under the contract. Id. A “fixed payment” may
include contingencies based on objective criteria, including organization or activity
revenues, but may not be subject to board discretion. Id. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(ii)(A).
168
I.R.C. § 4958(a)-(b).
169
Id. § 4958(a)(1).
170
Id. § 4958(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1(d)(3). Managers may avoid liability if
their participation was not willful and was due to reasonable cause. I.R.C. § 4958(a)(2).
171
I.R.C. § 4958(b), (f)(5).
172
Id. § 4958(f)(6). For example, a disqualified person who received an excessive
salary would likely need to repay not only the excess amount, but also any interest that the
organization would have earned on the excess amount had it been invested rather than paid
to the disqualified person.
173
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(ii)(B)(2)(i). State law generally permits such
indemnification so long as the individuals acted in good faith. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 145(a) (2011); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 722(a) (McKinney 2014); CAL.
CORP. CODE § 5238 (West 2012).
174
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a).
175
Id. §§ 53.4958-6(a)(1), 6(c)(1)(i).
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receive compensation or other benefits subject to the approval of the
disqualified person; (iv) have a material financial interest in the
compensation arrangement; or (v) approve the compensation of a
disqualified person who has or will approve the member’s compensation.176
These rules are designed to prevent the quid pro quo approval of
compensation among insiders.
Second, the governing body must base its decision on information
demonstrating that the compensation is fair market value.177 Generally, this
means data showing that comparable organizations provide similar
compensation for similar services.178 Comparability is based on a range of
factors, including geographical region, organization size, and the nature of
its services.179 Crucially, comparable organizations need not be taxexempt.180 Small organizations, with annual receipts normally less than $1
million, need only to identify three comparable organizations that pay
similar compensation in order to take advantage of the presumption of
reasonableness.181 Larger organizations generally rely on salary surveys
compiled by independent firms, but may also use “actual written offers
from similar institutions competing for [the candidate’s] services.”182
Relevant information may also include the availability of similar services
in the organization’s geographic area (i.e., whether the organization needs
to offer enough to entice a candidate—frequently a physician—to
relocate).183 The rules expressly permit the governing body to decide that
reasonable compensation falls above (or below) the range of the
comparability data, so long as it records the basis for this decision.184
Finally, the governing body must fully and concurrently document its
decision,185 including the members who were present and voting, the
comparability data and how it was obtained, and any actions taken to
manage conflicts of interest.186 Documentation must occur within sixty
days and be deemed accurate by the decision-making body within a
reasonable time thereafter.187 An organization that complies with these
steps will enjoy a presumption of reasonable compensation that can only be
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187

Id. §§ 53.4958-6(a)(1), 6(c)(1)(iii).
Id. § 53.4958-6(a).
Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(i).
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(i).
Id.
Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(ii).
Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(2)(i).
Id.
Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(ii).
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a)(3).
Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(i); § 53.4958-6(c)(3)–(ii).
Id. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(ii).
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overcome through an I.R.S. examination.
2. Private Foundations
Private foundations may face penalties for excessive compensation
under the Code’s self-dealing rules.188 Section 4941 prohibits transactions
between a private foundation and its disqualified persons, but exempts
compensation “for personal services which are reasonable and necessary to
carrying out the exempt purpose . . . if the compensation (or payment or
reimbursement) is not excessive.”189 Section 4941 defines excessive
compensation in accordance with Section 162, which governs the
deductibility of for-profit business expenses.190 Unlike the public charity
regime, Section 4941 offers no procedural safe harbor or initial contract
exception.
Like the intermediate sanctions rules for public charities, the Code
imposes two tiers of self-dealing penalties on private foundations. Under
the first tier, the self-dealer must pay a ten percent tax on the excess
compensation for each year until the self-dealing is corrected or discovered
by the I.R.S..191 Managers complicit in the self-dealing must pay a five
percent tax for each applicable year unless their participation was not
willful and was due to reasonable cause.192 If the I.R.S. detects the selfdealing before it has been corrected,193 the self-dealer and complicit
managers are liable for taxes of 200% and 50%, respectively.194 Manager
liability is joint and several, but capped at an aggregate $20,000 for any act
of self-dealing.195 Foundations thus work within a similar legal framework
for compensation as their public charity counterparts, but cannot access the
rebuttable presumption that compensation is reasonable.
B. Regulatory Enforcement Regime Assessment
The regulatory enforcement regime uses market rate as its metric for
reasonable compensation, defining the market to include comparable
exempt and non-exempt entities. This metric gives charities discretion to
make fact-specific compensation decisions, as well as woo for-profit
188

I.R.C. § 4941 (2018).
Id. §§ 4941(a)(1), (d)(2)(E). “Disqualified person” is defined more narrowly in
Section 4941 than under Section 4958, encompassing only managers, substantial
contributors, and their related businesses and family members. Id. § 4941. There is no
catchall category for other influential persons.
190
Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-3(c)(1) (referring to Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7).
191
I.R.C. §§ 4941(a)(1), (e)(1).
192
Id. § 4941(a)(2).
193
Id. §§ 4941(b), (e)(1).
194
Id. §§ 4941(b)(1)–(2).
195
Id. §§ 4941(c)(1)–(2).
189
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executives with competitive remuneration. In short, it recognizes the
reality of a diverse set of organizations with unique needs. Additionally,
the procedural safe harbor encourages charities to address the governance
failures that impair charities’ ability to set appropriate compensation in the
first place.
Despite these strengths, the framework presents normative and
practical challenges. First, the market rate metric creates a selfperpetuating spiral of inflated compensation that has little to do with
performance or economic conditions. Second, analogizing to the for-profit
sector is inappropriate due to cross-sector differences in the components of
compensation. Third, enforcement is labor-intensive and impractical. This
section addresses each problem in turn.
1. The Market Rate Metric
The market rate metric for reasonable compensation facilitates a cycle
of ever-increasing pay. This generally occurs through two practices: (i)
pegging the executive’s pay to the higher end of the market range on the
grounds that the executive is above average; and (ii) opportunistically
selecting comparability data for higher pay. As this process repeats, “the
inflated compensatory arrangements become market rate, and salaries
continue to soar.”196
The first practice consists of targeting executive compensation above
the market median. In large organizations that use salary survey data,
directors frequently consider their executives to be above average and peg
compensation to the higher end of the market compensation band.197 One
hospital survey revealed routine attempts to keep CEOs in the top twentyfive percent of the market data.198 A similar dynamic occurs in the forprofit sector: when for-profit firms perform well, compensation consultants
suggest performance-based compensation above the industry average,199
and when they perform poorly, consultants nevertheless argue for
compensation that reflects prevailing pay in the industry.200 One study
found that the “vast majority of the firms that use peer groups target pay
196
Jill S. Manny, Nonprofit Payments to Insiders and Outsiders: Is the Sky the Limit, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 740 (2007).
197
Ben Gose & Marisa López-Rivera, Nonprofit CEO Pay Won’t See Big Gains in
2012, Say Experts, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Sept. 20, 2012), https://www.philanthropy.com/
article/Nonprofit-CEO-Pay-Won-t-Rise/156113; see also Alan M. Cantor, Nice Work If You
Can Get It: Why Foundation CEOs Are Overpaid, INSIDE PHILANTHROPY (May 3, 2016),
http://www.insidephilanthropy.com/home/2016/5/3/nice-work-if-you-can-get-it-whyfoundation-ceos-are-overpaid.html#.
198
Gose & López-Rivera, supra note 197.
199
Agency Problem, supra note 76, at 79.
200
Id.
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levels at or above the 50th percentile.”201
The safe harbor rules for public charities permit such above-median
targeting so long as the charity records the basis for its decision.202 This
latitude may be advantageous where the charity differs in important
respects from its peer group or the executive brings unique skills and
expertise. Yet while there may be good reasons to target compensation
above the median in certain cases, the prevalence of this practice suggests
that other organizational and behavioral dynamics may be at work. The
literature on public companies suggests a few possible explanations for this
“Lake Wobegon effect,” a term coined for radio host Garrison Keillor’s
mythical Minnesota town where “all children are above average.”203
Directors may be reluctant to insult and demotivate executives who believe
themselves to be above average with median or below-median pay.204
Boards also believe that positioning their executives in the top half of their
peer group affects market perceptions of firm value.205 The charitable
sector may have an analogous tendency to see executive pay as a signal to
certain donors (particularly high-net worth and institutional donors) that an
organization is professional, well-managed, and financially sound.
The second practice that inflates compensation is the opportunistic
selection of peer groups. This has been observed in the for-profit sector,
where compensation committees select peer firms that are larger and
perform more strongly.206 Mandatory peer group disclosure, which the
SEC sometimes requires, 207 appears to restrain this tendency somewhat but
not entirely.208 Charities do not have any analogous requirement to
disclose their peer groups unless faced with an I.R.S. examination. Smaller
charities, which only need to identify three comparable compensation
arrangements to take advantage of the safe harbor, may be particularly

201
John M. Bizjak et. al., Does the Use of Peer Groups Contribute to Higher Pay and
Less Efficient Compensation?, 90 J. FIN. ECON. 152, 153 (2008).
202
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c)(3)(ii) (2019).
203
See, e.g., Are CEOs Worth Their Salaries?, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2002),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2002/10/02/are-ceos-worth-theirsalaries/e548ce2d-b69e-418a-84eb-096d81942759/; Adam Bryant, Earning It; Flying High
on the Option Express, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/05/bus
iness/earning-it-flying-high-on-the-option-express.html?pagewanted=all; Peter Whoriskey,
The “Lake Wobegon Effect” Lifts CEOs’ Pay, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2011, at A1.
204
Charles M. Elson & Craig K. Ferrere, Executive Superstars, Peer Groups, and
Overcompensation: Cause, Effect, and Solution, 38 J. CORP. L. 487, 521 (2013).
205
Rachel M. Hayes & Scott Schaefer, CEO Pay and the Lake Wobegon Effect, 94 J.
FIN. ECON. 280, 281 (2009).
206
See John Bizjak et. al., Are All CEOs Above Average? An Empirical Analysis of
Compensation Peer Groups and Pay Design, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 538, 539 (2011).
207
17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b)(2)(xiv) (2019).
208
Bizjak et. al., supra note 206, at 539.
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tempted to identify above-average compensation arrangements.209
2. The For-Profit Analogue
Public charities may justify their compensation levels based on those
of exempt and non-exempt organizations—including for-profit companies.
While experts generally advise against relying exclusively on for-profit
comparability data,210 any inclusion is likely to skew the data upwards.211
This may facilitate charity recruitment of business executives, but it also
imports inapplicable components of for-profit compensation into the
subsidized charitable sector.
An ostensible benefit of the for-profit analogue is in allowing charities
to compete for talent and attract high-caliber leadership. Pay parity can
help medical research charities recruit candidates from high-paying
biotechnology firms, and foundations may find it easier to attract financial
managers with for-profit banking and investment experience. Yet the
importance of matching for-profit pay should not be overstated. Charity
executives value their positions for a range of pecuniary and non-pecuniary
reasons, including the gratification of charitable work.212 Despite the
existing pay gap between the nonprofit and for-profit sectors, over twothirds of nonprofit executives report satisfaction with their
compensation.213
Overwhelmingly, nonprofits report that executive
retention is not a challenge, and only seven percent describe it as

209

Manny, supra note 196, at 740.
See, e.g., Gerald M. Griffith, The Dollars and Sense of Executive Compensation, 9
COMPLIANCE TODAY 20, 25 (Apr. 2009), https://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/6c219
3f4-d546-419e-99d8-fe2c13fb2a9d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/966d1b03-ffa949e2-bbda-054707127416/ct0407_GriffithKing.pdf; Eileen Morgan Johnson, Executive
Compensation for Exempt Organizations, WHITEFORD, TAYLOR & PRESTON, L.L.P. 3 (2006),
http://www.wtplaw.com/sites/default/files/document_pdf/article/executive_compensation_f
or_exempt_organizations_2.pdf.
211
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Nonprofit Pay and Benefits: Estimates from the National
Compensation Survey, MONTHLY LABOR REV. (Jan. 2016), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/20
16/article/nonprofit-pay-and-benefits.htm (reporting a compensation differential of $4.67
per hour between nonprofit and for-profit management and professional workers). A study
comparing charity and for-profit executive compensation would likely show a far greater
difference.
212
Keep Charity Charitable, supra note 36, at 1223.
213
Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 211. (reporting an average compensation
differential of $4.67 per hour between “management, professional, and related workers” in
nonprofit and for-profits). Because the nonprofit sector is broader than the charitable sector
and includes, for example, political organizations and labor unions, this figure is likely to
underestimate of the wage difference between charity and for-profit leaders. Marla
Cornelius, Demographics & Salary, DARING TO LEAD (June 13, 2011), http://daringtolead.or
g/demographics/demographics-salary/. Only ten percent of executives were “not at all”
satisfied, which corresponds to the percentage of respondents earning less than $30,000. Id.
210
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“significantly challenging.”214 This suggests that while the ability to pay
competitive rates may be an advantage, matching for-profit pay is generally
not vital to attracting and retaining executive talent.
For-profit compensation is a flawed analogue for charitable
compensation due to cross-sector differences in the appropriate
components of remuneration. Three elements in particular are not
transferable to the charitable sector: (i) profits distribution, which is
forbidden to charities; (ii) cash premiums to compensate for the risk of
accepting equity compensation, which has no application to charities; and
(iii) unearned rents, which are normatively less acceptable in the charitable
sector. Because these components are not neatly labeled as such, it is
virtually impossible to extricate them from the overall for-profit
compensation amounts in order to determine appropriate charity
compensation levels.
Profits Distribution. Charities are forbidden to allocate net earnings
to executives or other insiders. The prohibition on private inurement is
strictly construed, precluding even executive compensation tied to
organization revenues or other performance measures.215
Business
compensation, on the other hand, is often inextricably tied to profits
distribution.216 For-profit executives frequently receive a combination of
base salary, benefits, bonuses, stock, and stock options.217 It would be
convenient to presume that base pay represents the value of services while
equity and bonuses represent profits distribution, but companies frequently
switch between these forms of compensation based on exogenous factors.
For example, the Great Recession prompted a surge in equity grant
compensation, but businesses largely reverted to cash in 2014 amid fears
that the market had peaked.218 This increase in cash compensation did not
reflect an abrupt increase in the value of the executives’ services.
Similarly, equity compensation skyrocketed in the 1990s after Congress
enacted favorable tax treatment for performance-based remuneration,219 but
the TCJA’s repeal of that provision has at least some companies
214
2013 Nonprofit Employment Trends Survey, NONPROFIT H.R. SOLUTIONS 21 (2013),
http://www.nonprofithr.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/2013-Employment-TrendsSurvey-Report.pdf. They overwhelmingly reported greater retention problems in low- and
mid-level positions than in experienced and executive positions. Id. at 19.
215
See World Family Corp. v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 958, 968 (1983); I.R.S. Gen. Couns.
Mem. 39,670 (Oct. 14, 1987).
216
Peter Frumkin & Alice Andre-Clark, Nonprofit Compensation and the Market, 21
HAW. L. REV. 425, 465 (1999).
217
Jeppson et. al., supra note 79, at 83–84.
218
Theo Francis & Joann S. Lublin, CEOs Awarded More Cash Pay, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
21, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ceos-awarded-more-cash-pay-1429608602.
219
Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL’Y. 283, 289–91 (2005).
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reconfiguring their compensation packages to increase base salaries and
curb bonus arrangements.220 Profits distribution is not easily divisible from
the rest of the compensation package, and using for-profit compensation as
a benchmark risks incorporating profits distribution into charity
compensation.
Risk Premiums. As discussed in Part III, optimal contracting theorists
claim that providing equity compensation to executives necessitates an
additional cash premium to offset the resulting non-diversification
burden.221 This notion purported to explain why the 1990s spike in equity
compensation was accompanied by an immense surge in cash
compensation.222 To the extent that this explanation bears out, it has no
application to the charitable sector. Since charities cannot provide equity
compensation, there is no rationale for a compensatory risk premium.
Unearned Rents. There is evidence to support the managerial power
theory contention that executives extract at least some rents from for-profit
businesses.223 To the extent that this occurs, such arrangements do not
reflect reasonable compensation for services, but weaknesses in corporate
governance and organizational dynamics. Transferring the value of such
arrangements wholesale to the charitable sector, as permitted by current
regulations, would result in the diversion of taxpayer-subsidized charitable
resources into the hands of private executives. While rent extraction is suboptimal in any organization, including for-profit companies, it is
normatively even less appropriate for charities due to their tax
subsidization and the lack of recourse available to beneficiaries.
3. Enforceability
The I.R.S. does not—and will not for the foreseeable future—enforce
the private inurement rules with sufficient vigor to secure compliance or
even ascertain the scale of the problem.224 Because most charities can
access the presumption of reasonable compensation by following simple
procedures, regulatory enforcement involves a fact- and resource-intensive
investigation.225 The I.R.S. must review the organization’s procedures and
220

Renae Merle, Skyrocketing Executive Pay Packages Are About to Become More
Costly for Corporate America, WASH. POST. (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.co
m/news/business/wp/2018/01/03/skyrocketing-executive-pay-packages-are-about-tobecome-more-costly-for-corporate-america/?utm_term=.8c6bd3185598.
221
Hall & Murphy, supra note 74, at 5.
222
Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 219, at 291.
223
See, e.g., van Essen et. al., supra note 95, 183–84; Chongwoo Choe et. al., CEO
Power and the Structure of CEO Pay, 35 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 237–48 (2014) (finding
support for the managerial power theory in the relationship between power and pay).
224
G.A.O. Report, supra note 160, at 40–41.
225
See infra Part V.
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comparability data, determine whether the organization is in fact entitled to
the presumption, and, if so, amass sufficient rebuttal evidence to impose
penalties.226 At present, I.R.S. resource constraints prevent this sort of
investigation from occurring at a meaningful scale.
The I.R.S. operates under ever-tightening budgetary constraints that
have decimated enforcement.227 Between 2010 and 2016, its workforce
shrank by 17,000 employees.228 In roughly the same period, funds for
employee training declined by nearly seventy-five percent.229 These trends
have particularly strained the enforcement capabilities of the Tax Exempt
and Government Entities Division (TEGE).230 From 2011 to 2016, funding
declined by twenty percent and staffing by twenty-seven percent.231 The
rate of I.R.S. charity examinations is anemic and falling.232 In 2017, the
I.R.S. examined just one-fifth of one percent of charity tax returns,233 and
completed only 109 examinations of charities for private inurement
issues.234 The examination rate is likely to further decline as the I.R.S.
recognizes around 80,000 new charities each year.235
226

Id.
Chuck Marr & Cecile Murray, I.R.S. Funding Cuts Compromise Taxpayer Service
and Weaken Enforcement, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (Apr. 4, 2016),
http://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/irs-funding-cuts-compromise-taxpayer-serviceand-weaken-enforcement.
228
Hearing Before the Senate Fin. Comm., 114th Cong. 1 (2016) (written testimony of
John A. Koskinen, Comm’r. of Internal Revenue), http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/med
ia/doc/2016%20JAK%20testimony%20SFC%20on%20FY17%20budget%20021016x.pdf.
229
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 86 (2017), https://taxp
ayeradvocate.irs.gov/reports/2017-annual-report-to-congress/full-report.
230
See, e.g., Josh Hicks, Shrinking I.R.S. Struggles to Keep Pace with Growing Number
of Tax-Exempt Charities, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/new
s/federal-eye/wp/2015/01/09/shrinking-irs-struggles-to-keep-up-with-growing-number-oftax-exempt-charities/.
231
Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Fallout from Allegations of Tea Party Targeting Hamper
I.R.S. Oversight of Nonprofits, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.co
m/investigations/fallout-from-allegations-of-tea-party-targeting-hamper-irs-oversight-ofnonprofits/2017/12/17/6403c1c0-c59e-11e7-a441-3a768c8586f1_story.html?utm_term=.
5de5269dc993.
232
G.A.O. Report, supra note 160, at 1–2.
233
The I.R.S. examined 2,375 returns in fiscal year 2017. Data Book, 2017, Pub. 55B,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 1, 34 (Mar. 2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/17databk.pdf.
There were 1,286,181 recognized charities in this period. Id. at 57.
234
Tax Exempt and Government Entities FY 2017 Accomplishments, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV. 1, 3–4 (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/tege_fy2017_acco
mplishments.pdf. Three of these examinations resulted in revocation. Id. It is unknown
how many resulted in financial penalties.
235
FY2017 had 79,699 approvals. Data Book, 2017, Pub. 55B, supra note 233, at 52.
FY2016 had 79,545 approvals. Data Book, 2016, Pub. 55B, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 1,
52 (Mar. 2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/16databk.pdf. FY2015 had 86,915
approvals. Data Book, 2015, Pub. 55B, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 1, 54 (Mar. 2016),
227
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In response to resource constraints and the political fallout of
allegations that the TEGE unfairly targeted conservative organizations for
scrutiny,236 the TEGE has turned to technology to guide its review of
charities.237 The TEGE has also begun implementing a data-driven process
of selecting charities to examine.238 Rather than targeting particular subsectors based on the perceived prevalence of abuse, the TEGE will use data
analytics to identify likely violations from Form 990 responses and
discrepancies.239 It is not yet known whether data-driven targeting of
examinations will offset the decline in trained examiners and examinations.
Previous attempts at streamlining exempt organization oversight have not
been an unqualified success. In 2014, the TEGE introduced a dramatically
simplified online application for exemption,240 which the I.R.S.’s own
studies show has resulted in an erroneous approval rate of over forty
percent.241 Even if the TEGE’s analytic targeting is effective in identifying
likely violators, it will still need to conduct a time- and labor-intensive
examination to rebut the presumption of reasonableness and impose
sanctions. If current trends in I.R.S. funding persist, charities are unlikely
to face accountability through this mechanism.
VI. THIRD MECHANISM: THE TCJA EXCISE TAX
The third constraint on compensation is the TCJA’s across-the-board
excise tax on remuneration in excess of $1 million. In some respects, this
is the most promising measure to date, offering a consistently enforceable
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/15databk.pdf.
236
The “I.R.S. targeting scandal” alleged that the TEGE unfairly targeted groups
affiliated with the Tea Party movement that applied for tax exemption under Section
501(c)(4) of the Code. Some conservative commentators likened the accusations to
Watergate and called for abolition of the agency. O’Harrow, supra note 231.
237
Ruth McCambridge & Virginia Gross, Changes in the I.R.S. Oversight of Nonprofits:
A Conversation with Virginia Gross, NONPROFIT Q. (Aug. 8, 2016), https://nonprofitquarterl
y.org/2016/08/08/changes-irs-501-c-3-oversight-nonprofits/. The targeting scandal involved
the I.R.S. applying disproportionate scrutiny to “tea party” advocacy organizations as they
proliferated in 2013.
238
McCambridge & Gross, supra note 237.
239
Id.
240
Form 1023-EZ is permitted for organizations that project average annual revenues of
no more than $50,000 for their first three years and meet a variety of other standards. 2017
Annual Report to Congress, TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV. 1, 64 n.2 (2017),
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2017-ARC/ARC17_Volume1_
MSP_05_ExemptOrganizations.pdf. By the third quarter of 2017, sixty-four percent of
applications were submitted on Form 1023-EZ. Id. at 64 n.5.
241
Id. at 65. This figure was calculated by reviewing the articles of incorporation of
organizations in the 24 states that post them online. In 2015-16, forty-six percent of
organizations that successfully submitted the streamlined application did not even meet the
basic “organizational test” for 501(c)(3) status. This test is based exclusively on the
language in the organization’s paperwork. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1).
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mechanism of accountability that upholds the purpose of the tax exemption
while preserving some charity discretion. The metric for imposing the tax,
however, is arbitrary and untethered to any meaningful measure of
reasonableness or performance.
A. Excise Tax Regime Overview
Under the TCJA, charities must pay the standard corporate tax rate of
twenty-one percent on all remuneration to any “covered employee” over $1
million, including any parachute payments and remuneration paid by
related organizations.242 Covered employees include the five highestcompensated employees in the present tax year or any preceding tax year
after December 31, 2016.243 The Code creates an exception for
compensation paid to procure the services of licensed medical and
veterinary professionals,244 perhaps in recognition of the high cost of luring
these professionals to underserved rural areas. At the time of publication,
the I.R.S. had not yet finalized regulations to govern implementation of the
excise tax.
In enacting the excise tax, Congress created symmetry with the
compensation rules for publicly held corporations under Section 162(m) of
the Code. While businesses may generally deduct from their taxable
income “a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for
personal services actually rendered[,]”245 Section 162(m) forbids publicly
traded corporations from deducting compensation amounts over $1 million
paid to covered employees,246 including the CEO and four other highestpaid officers.247
B. Excise Tax Regime Assessment
It is too early to determine whether the TCJA excise tax will actually
affect compensation levels. Its for-profit analogue, Section 162(m), has
failed to curtail executive pay in the quarter-century since its enactment.248
Observers have often attributed this failure to Section 162(m)’s broad
exception for performance-based compensation.249 This exception, which
242

I.R.C. §§ 4960(a), (c)(4) (2018).
Id. § 4960(c)(2).
244
Id. § 4960(c)(3)(B).
245
Id. § 162(a)(1).
246
Id. § 162(m).
247
See id. § 162(m)(3).
248
See Meegan Reilly, Former Treasury Official Discusses Executive Compensation
Cap, 62 TAX NOTES 747 (1994) (noting that while the law generates $2.5 billion in annual
tax revenue, its stated goal was to reduce executive compensation).
249
Executive Compensation: Backdating to the Future: Hearing Before the Senate
Committee on Finance, 109th Cong. 37 (2006) (closing statement of Senator Chuck
243
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was repealed by the TCJA, covered commissions based on income directly
attributable to the individual’s performance.250 It also covered any other
pay based on the achievement of objectively measurable performance
goals, so long as an independent board committee and the shareholders
approved the arrangement in advance.251 In the aftermath of Section
162(m)’s passage, equity skyrocketed from thirty-seven percent to fiftyfive percent of total executive compensation.252 At the same time, cash
compensation boomed nearly forty percent,253 which optimal contracting
theorists justify as a “non-diversification premium,” and managerial power
theorists ascribe to rent extraction.254
Even discounting the now-repealed exception for performance-based
compensation, Section 162(m) does not appear to have achieved the
intended effect. Perversely, some smaller companies increased their
compensation to the $1 million limit because Section 162(m) nudged
perceptions of reasonableness upward.255 Others forewent the deduction
and continued to compensate executives in excess of the ceiling.256
It is plausible that the TCJA cap may likewise fail to curb
overcompensation, but this does not necessarily render the excise tax
mechanism ineffectual. Even if it does little to curtail compensation levels,
it will nevertheless provide a measure of accountability for use of the
501(c)(3) exemption.257 The excise tax mechanism effectively treats
charity income used to provide excessive compensation as non-exempt.
This mirrors the treatment of charity earnings from commercial activities:
if a commercial activity does not “contribute importantly” to the charity’s

Grassley), https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/090606cga.pdf. Sen. Grassley,
then serving as Chair of the Senate Committee on Finance, described the law as “broken”
and having “more holes than Swiss cheese.” Id.
250
I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(B) (repealed 2017)..
251
Id. § 162(m)(4)(C) (repealed 2017).
252
Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 219, at 289–91.
253
Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 219, at 291.
254
Hall & Murphy, supra note 74, at 5; Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 219, at 301.
255
David G. Harris & Jane R. Livingstone, Federal Tax Legislation as an Implicit
Contracting Cost Benchmark: The Definition of Excessive Executive Compensation, 77
ACCT. REV. 997, 997 (2002); John Byrne, That’s Some Pay Cap, Bill, BUS. WK. (Apr. 24,
1994), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/1994-04-24/thats-some-pay-cap-bill.
256
Steven Balsam & Qin Jennifer Yin, Explaining Firm Willingness to Forfeit Tax
Deductions Under Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m): The Million Dollar Cap, 24 J.
ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 300, 321 (2005). Their willingness to do so depends on a variety of
factors, including shareholder lobbying, the cost of restructuring compensation
arrangements, and whether the loss of the deduction will actually and immediately result in
more tax liability. Present Law & Background Related to Executive Compensation, JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION 1, 6 (Sept. 6, 2006), http://www.jct.gov/x-39-06.pdf.
257
The excise tax does not completely negate the Section 501(c)(3) tax advantage with
respect to that income, as it may still be deductible to the donor.
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exempt purposes, its net proceeds are generally subject to UBIT.258 Both
the TCJA excise tax and UBIT evince the principle that charities warrant
tax exemption only to the extent that they behave like charities.259 When
charities behave like conventional businesses, they cannot take advantage
of preferential tax treatment. Similarly, to the extent that charities pay
excessive compensation to their executives, they should not benefit from
preferential tax treatment. The excise tax therefore upholds both charities’
discretion to make fact-specific compensation decisions and Congress’s
intent that the taxpayer subsidy be used for charitable outputs rather than
private gain.
The ceiling on tax-advantaged compensation also has the benefit of
enforceability. Unlike the public disclosure regime, which is hindered by
the donor information and outrage deficits, and the regulatory enforcement
regime, which relies on fact-intensive individual examinations, the TCJA
excise tax is easily administered. Charities have clear directions, and the
I.R.S. can easily detect noncompliance. The I.R.S. may still investigate
cases of suspected private inurement and revoke the exemption altogether,
but this is no longer the only source of accountability. The TCJA excise
tax assures the public that charities face certain consequences for the
egregious diversion of their resources.
The most salient weakness of the excise tax mechanism is its failure to
offer a meaningful metric for reasonable compensation. It imports the
arbitrary $1 million limitation of Section 162(m), which originated from
the early 1990s trend of executive salaries topping the million-dollar
mark.260 It also fails to impose accountability for excessive compensation
beneath the million-dollar ceiling. While it may capture certain egregious
cases of overcompensation, it does not go far enough in ensuring that
public subsidies are devoted exclusively to the public good.

258
Unrelated business income tax applies to the net income from a trade or business that
is regularly carried on and is not substantially related to the organization’s exempt purposes.
I.R.C. § 511(1) (2018); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a) (2019). A trade or business is substantially
related to an organization’s exempt purposes if it contributes importantly to the
accomplishment of those purposes. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d).
259
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b).
260
Ryan Miske, Can’t Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of Trying to
Control Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1673, 1688
(2004). Legislative history does not reveal any clear rationale for the selection of the $1
million figure, but it may have been a response to the trajectory of executive compensation
in the early 1990s—rising from $624,996 in 1980 to $1.9 million in 1990. Linda Levine,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., A Comparison of the Pay of Top Executives and Other
Workers 3-4 (2004), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1181
&context=key_workplace.
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VII. BEYOND THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT
With the enactment of the TCJA excise tax, the law now offers three
legal mechanisms to constrain charity compensation. Taken together, they
impose a piecemeal accountability, likely to affect only the few charities
that fall into the media’s crosshairs, are individually examined by the
I.R.S., or pay over $1 million to their top executives.
The general construct of the excise tax provides the most promising
oversight framework. It offers a consistently enforceable system, latitude
for charity leaders to make decisions based on their specific circumstances,
and accountability for the use of the charitable tax exemption. Its primary
weakness is the failure to offer a meaningful metric for determining
whether compensation should be tax-advantaged. This Part examines the
metrics used by two analogous regulatory frameworks—first, for public
sector pay, and second, for compensation of bankruptcy trustees—and their
respective transferability to the charitable sector. The overall goal of this
inquiry is to align the regulatory system with the policy purpose of the
charitable exemption; that is, to ensure that tax subsidies further exempt
purposes rather than private enrichment. This Part then suggests a
synthesis of these frameworks that could improve compensation metrics in
the charitable sector, and proposes avenues for further research.
A. Public Sector Metric
Given the weakness of the for-profit analogue, a potential alternative
is to benchmark executive compensation in the charitable sector against
that of public-sector employees. This idea is not new—state proposals to
limit executive compensation frequently invoke the pay levels of
government officials.261 A Florida bill, for example, aimed to restrict
nonprofit employees to the salary of the highest-paid statewide official
unless the organization received special dispensation from the state budget
commission.262 Such comparisons have intuitive appeal, since the public
sector, like charities, receives public subsidies and operates for the purpose

261

In 2016, lawsuits thwarted ballot initiatives in California and Arizona to limit
hospital executive compensation to that of the U.S. President. See Howard Fischer,
Hospital Pay Cap Initiative Won’t Be on November Ballot, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Aug. 16,
2016), http://tucson.com/news/state-and-regional/hospital-pay-cap-initiative-won-t-be-onnovember-ballot/article_366ae68c-0a9b-5b7e-895a-e4c839a26e55.html;
John
Myers,
Healthcare Workers Union Is Withdrawing Its November Initiative on Hospital CEO
Salaries, L.A. TIMES (June 30, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-essentialpolitics-healthcare-workers-union-is-pulling-its-1467156556-htmlstory.html.
262
S. 596, 2012 Leg. Session (Fla. 2012), https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2012/0
596/BillText/c1/HTML; see H.R. 545, 2012 Leg. Session (Fla. 2012),
https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2012/0545/BillText/Filed/PDF (corresponding bill).
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of providing socially beneficial goods.263
1. Overview
Federal employees are generally compensated in accordance with
“their rank in a pay schedule.”264 The General Schedule (“GS”), which
covers a majority of federal employees,265 consists of fifteen grade levels,
with ten salary steps within each grade.266 Nationwide standards determine
the grade of a given position based on its complexity, responsibility, and
prerequisite levels of education and experience.267 Employees generally
receive salary step increases in accordance with a standardized timeline—
annually for steps one to three, biennially for steps four to six, and
triennially for steps seven to nine.268 They can also ascend salary steps
through exceptional performance, or “quality steps,” and receive annual
bonuses that boost their compensation for a particular year of strong
performance.269 Locality payments are intended to adjust the federal pay
scale to account for the local cost of living in forty-seven geographical
areas.270 Generous benefits, including health and retirement plans,271
constitute approximately thirty-nine percent of total federal
compensation.272

263
For this reason, there is a level of public accountability and transparency regarding
public sector salaries that is not generally seen in the for-profit world. See Josh Hicks, New
Web Site Allows Easy Salary Spying on Federal Workers, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2013/08/16/new-web-site-allowseasy-salary-spying-on-federal-workers/.
264
Comparing the Compensation of Federal and Private-Sector Employees, CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE 1, 15 (Jan. 2012), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/42921.
265
Id.
266
General Schedule Classification and Pay, OFFICE PERSONNEL MGMT.,
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/pay-systems/general-schedule/ (last
visited Feb. 27, 2019).
267
See id.
268
Id.
269
Id.
270
Id.
271
The Federal Employees Retirement System (“FERS”) allows employees who have
completed five years of service to receive a portion of their salary upon retirement,
calculated as one percent of their highest three-year average salary multiplied by years of
service. Enhanced benefits are available for certain employees, including law enforcement
officers and firefighters. After retirees turn 62, their payout is somewhat adjusted for cost of
living, giving them some protection against inflation. FERS also includes the equivalent of
a 401(k) in the Thrift Savings Plan, which matches 100% the first three percent of employee
contributions and fifty percent of contributions for the next two percent. FERS Information,
OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, https://www.opm.gov/retirement-services/fers-information/ (last
visited Nov. 7, 2019).
272
Comparing the Compensation of Federal and Private-Sector Employees, supra note
264, at 9.
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In general, non-GS employees have more variable and higher average
compensation than GS employees,273 but may not receive locality pay.274
The Executive Schedule establishes pay rates for Cabinet members, nonCabinet agency directors, deputy heads of agencies, chairpersons of federal
commissions and boards, and specified lower-level executives.275 The
Senior Executive Service consists of employees in designated leadership
positions across federal agencies.276 Agencies have latitude in awarding
performance bonuses for these positions,277 but compensation is subject to
an aggregate limit of the Vice President’s total pay.278 As of January 2019,
this limitation was $243,500.279 A similar non-GS system governs the
compensation of specialized research scientists.280
The public sector has long grappled with the balance between
attracting talent and responsibly stewarding taxpayer money. By law, the
federal government seeks to provide pay parity with non-federal
employment (i.e., in state and local government as well as the private
sector).281 The Congressional Budget Office has found that the difference
273

Characteristics and Pay of Federal Civilian Employees, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE 1, 9
(Mar. 2007), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress-2007-2008/reports/0315-federal_personnel.pdf.
274
Continuation of Locality Payments for Non-General Schedule Employees, THE
PRESIDENT’S PAY AGENT (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/payleave/salaries-wages/2018/continuation-of-locality-payments-for-non-general-scheduleemployees-november-9-2018.pdf.
275
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 5312, 5313 (2018).
276
Id. § 3132(a)(2) (A senior executive is a non-presidential appointee who “directs the
work of an organizational unit[,] is held accountable for the success of one or more specific
programs or projects[,] [ . . . ] supervises the work of employees other than personal
assistants[,] or otherwise exercises important policy-making, policy-determining, or other
executive functions[.]”); Id. § 3132(a)(3). SES positions are designated by agencies “in
accordance with [OPM] guidelines.” 5 C.F.R. § 214.202(a) (2019).
277
Each agency must develop a performance management system and appoint a
performance review board to ensure the integrity of bonus decisions. 5 C.F.R. § 430.304(a).
Federal regulations set forth requirements for performance criteria, monitoring, and
assessment. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 430.305–09. Performance awards are between five and twenty
percent of the executive’s basic pay. Senior Executive Service Compensation, OFFICE OF
PERSONNEL MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/senior-executive-service/co
mpensation/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2019).
278
3 U.S.C. § 104(a) (establishing the Vice President’s per annum salary rate); 5 C.F.R.
§ 530.202 (defining “aggregate limitation” as the Vice President’s total annual
compensation under 3 U.S.C. § 104).
279
Exec. Order No. 13,856, 85 Fed. Reg. 65 (Dec. 28, 2018).
280
5 C.F.R. §534(e).
281
The Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-509, § 529, 104
Stat. 1389 (1990), declared it the policy of Congress with respect to the General Schedule
for “[f]ederal pay rates [to] be comparable with non-Federal pay rates for the same levels of
work within the same local pay area” and “any existing pay disparities between Federal and
non-Federal employees should be completely eliminated.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 5301(3)–(4). This
statement applies specifically to GS employees, who account for over sixty percent of the
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between GS and private-sector salaries depends on educational attainment.
Compared to the private sector, federal employees without a bachelor’s
degree earn higher salaries (by twenty-one percent), those with a bachelor’s
degree earn equivalent salaries, and those with an advanced degree earn
lower salaries (by twenty-three percent).282 Due to generous government
benefits, however, federal employees with a bachelor’s degree earn fifteen
percent more in total compensation, and the differential for those with
advanced degrees drops to eighteen percent.283 Federal employment
therefore imposes a higher opportunity cost for those credentialed
individuals who are more likely to fill executive positions in the private
sector.
2. Metric Assessment
Public sector pay offers a well-developed, location- and skill-specific
metric that is designed to balance the need for talent with responsibility for
taxpayer money. The Senior Executive Service scale provides a rough
analogue to the skills and responsibilities of charity executives. Moreover,
the public and charitable sectors have similar goals of furthering public
welfare.
Unlike the for-profit sector, which is systematically (if
imperfectly) accountable to shareholders, the public and charitable sectors
are held accountable primarily through government ombudsmen,
regulators, and occasional episodes of media-driven public outrage. The
public-sector analogue is also more appropriate than the for-profit analogue
because it does not permit profits distribution, does not incentivize risktaking, and does not have some of the features facilitate rent extraction.
Despite these advantages, using federal compensation as an analogue
for reasonable charity compensation would pose considerable challenges.
First, federal employees of all education levels enjoy more job security
than private sector workers,284 due to both the stability of taxpayer
financing285 and constitutional protections against arbitrary dismissal.286
federal workforce. Comparing the Compensation of Federal and Private-Sector Employees,
supra note 264, at 15.
282
Comparing the Compensation of Federal and Private-Sector Employees, supra note
264, at viii.
283
Comparing the Compensation of Federal and Private-Sector Employees, supra note
264, at ix.
284
Jason L. Kopelman & Harvey S. Rosen, Are Public Sector Jobs Recession Proof?
Were They Ever?, 44 PUB. FIN. REV. 370, 382–84 (2016) (finding federal employees 4.2%
“less likely to lose their jobs than private sector workers,” and between 5.3–6.5% less likely
to lose their jobs during a recession); id. at 389 (finding slightly smaller gap in job loss
probability for those with a college degree).
285
Id. at 389.
286
In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, the Supreme Court held that public
sector employees have a property interest in their employment and therefore a Constitutional
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Charity executives would rationally demand higher compensation to offset
greater job risk.287 Second, it may be impracticable for charities to either
identify comparable federal positions or apply the complex federal wage
determination system. The federal government relies on an expensive
bureaucracy to administer the system, which is not a luxury available to
most charities.288 Enforcement, too, would be difficult, as the I.R.S. would
need to individually determine whether charities had appropriately applied
the federal pay scale.
B. Expenditure-Based Formula
Another model that merits consideration is a compensation ceiling
tied to the amount of charitable work conducted by the organization. This
would resemble the compensation framework for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
trustees, whose legal duty resembles that of charity executives and whose
maximum compensation is linked to payments in furtherance of that duty.
1. Overview
Chapter 11 trustees oversee reorganization bankruptcies wherein the
entity continues to operate but agrees to repay all or a portion of its
outstanding debt in accordance with a court-approved payment plan.289
The appointment of a trustee is rare, typically reserved for cases of gross
mismanagement, dishonesty, or fraud by the current management.290 In
addition to regular trustee responsibilities, which include investigating the
debtor’s financial situation,291 identifying and reporting any

entitlement to due process before termination. 470 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1985).
287
See Florian S. Peters & Alexander F. Wagner, The Executive Turnover Risk
Premium, 69 J. FIN. 1529, 1556 (2014).
288
The Office of Personnel Management reported that the cost of administering the
federal wage system was approximately $5.8 million in the 2001 fiscal year. The report was
prepared at the direction of the House Committee on Appropriations, and does not appear to
have been replicated in the subsequent years. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, REPORT
TO CONGRESS: COST OF ADMINISTERING THE FEDERAL WAGE SYSTEM (March 2002),
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/pay-systems/federal-wagesystem/reports-to-congress/cost-of-administering-the-federal-wage-system/#wagesurveys.
289
11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(1)–(5), 1129(a) (2018). In contrast, when a business
undergoes Chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy, all assets are sold, the proceeds go to repay
creditors, and the business ceases to operate. Id. § 726(a). The court may authorize the
trustee to continue operating the business for a limited period of time if it determines that
continued operations are in the best interest of the estate and consistent with orderly
liquidation. Id. § 721.
290
11 U.S.C. § 1104(a); In re Texasoil Enterprises, Inc., 296 B.R. 431, 435 (N.D. Tex.
2003) (calling the appointment of a trustee “draconian and correspondingly rare.”). In most
cases, the debtor-in-possession assumes the duties of a trustee, but without entitlement to
compensation under the scheme described in this Part. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107(a), 1108.
291
Id. § 1106(a)(3).
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mismanagement or irregularities,292 and formulating and implementing a
payment plan,293 a Chapter 11 trustee may also operate the debtor’s
business.294 This expansive role encompasses “services similar to those
that would be provided by a corporate executive, such as a chairman of the
board and chief executive officer.”295
Trustees have fiduciary obligations similar to those of charity
executives. While federal statutes do not clearly explain the trustee’s
standard of conduct,296 beyond providing that a trustee must serve as “the
representative of the estate”297 and “be accountable for all property
received,”298 courts have consistently held that bankruptcy trustees owe
fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries of estates.299 Generally, these duties
include the duty of care (i.e., to not act negligently), the duty of loyalty
(i.e., to not act in the trustee’s own interests), and the duty of obedience
(i.e., to not act outside the fiduciary’s designated authority).300 Trustees
must observe these duties in the course of allocating and distributing assets
to creditors. Their fundamental responsibility parallels that of charity
directors and officers—to ensure that a particular pool of assets is used
exclusively for designated purposes.
Bankruptcy courts may award trustees “reasonable compensation for
actual, necessary services rendered,” as well as “reimbursement for actual,
necessary expenses.”301 The amount may be set on an hourly, fixed,
percentage, or contingency basis.302 The law forbids compensation for
292

Id. § 1106(a)(4).
Id. § 1106(a)(5).
294
Id. §1108.
295
In re Marvel Entm’t Grp., Inc., 234 B.R. 21, 42 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999).
296
See Elizabeth H. McCullough, Bankruptcy Trustee Liability: Is There a Method in
the Madness?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 153, 156 (2011).
297
11 U.S.C. § 323(a).
298
Id. §§ 704(a)(2), 1106(a)(1).
299
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985)
(“[T]he fiduciary duty of the trustee runs to shareholders as well as to creditors.”); Flugence
v. Axis Surplus Ins. Co. (In re Flugence), 738 F.3d 126, 131 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Because the
trustee is the fiduciary of the estate, he has a duty to ensure that the compensation
arrangements made with attorneys and others are in the best interests of the creditors.”); Dye
v. Brown (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 530 F.3d 832, 844 (9th Cir. 2008) (“A trustee is the
‘legal representative’ and ‘fiduciary’ of the estate.”); Martin v. Martin (In re Martin), 91
F.3d 389, 394 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he district court was correct in emphasizing the role of the
trustee as a fiduciary.”).
300
In re Novak, 383 B.R. 660, 671 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2008). Some scholars have also
attributed a wide range of other duties to bankruptcy trustees, including duties of
distribution maximization, diligence, accountability, competence, candor, civility, good
faith, and fair dealing. Steven Rhodes, The Fiduciary and Institutional Obligations of a
Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 147, 154 (2006).
301
11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1).
302
Id. § 328(a).
293
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services that are duplicative, unnecessary, or not “reasonably likely to
benefit the [debtor’s] estate.”303 The compensation amount is capped based
on on the value of assets distributed to creditors.304
Aggregate
compensation of all trustees involved in a case may not exceed twenty-five
percent of the first $5,000 disbursed, ten percent of the next $45,000
disbursed, five percent on the next $950,000 disbursed, and three percent
on any amounts exceeding $1 million.305 The compensation of a trustee
who distributed $1 million could therefore not exceed $53,250.
Because the statute commands courts to treat all bankruptcy trustee
compensation as a “commission,”306 some trustees have claimed that they
are presumptively entitled to the statutory maximum. 307 Courts have
rejected this argument on the grounds that the Chapter 11 provisions
specifically require courts to set compensation based on a range of
variables relating to the nature, extent, and value of a trustee’s services.308
In light of this, courts generally seek to use an objective market-rate
standard, subject to the statutory maximums.309 Notably, courts are obliged
to independently review the reasonableness of fees, even if the interested
parties have consented to (or failed to object to) the fees.310
303

Id. § 330(a)(4)(A)(ii)(I).
Id. § 326(a).
305
Id. §§ 326(a), (c).
306
Id. § 330(a)(7).
307
See, e.g., In re Virgin Offshore USA, Inc., Debtors, No. 11-13028, 2015 WL
350898, at *3 (Bankr. E. D. La. Jan. 26, 2015).
308
Id.; see also In re Marvel Entm’t Grp., Inc., 234 B.R. 21, 38–39 (Bankr. D. Del.
1999) (rejecting the notion that Congress intended to provide an automatic commission
based on assets disbursed). The Marvel court cited six reasons for its conclusion: (1) the
statutory language, which states that the percentages only constituted a cap and provides
other factors upon which the court should fix compensation levels; (2) the absence of
support for this approach in the case law; (3) the absence of “any principled relationship
between the amounts disbursed by a debtor corporation and what would be reasonable
compensation for a trustee appointed to represent the estate”; (4) the risk that such an
entitlement could lead to corruption in the appointment of trustees; (5) the risk that trustees
will remain in place beyond their usefulness in order to capture financial gains; and (6) the
risk that “extraordinarily high levels of compensation that bear no reasonable relation to the
value of the services provided” could cause courts to avoid appointing trustees when it may
otherwise be appropriate. Id. at 38–40. But see Mohns, Inc. v. Lanser, 522 B.R. 594, 599
n.1 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2015) (stating in the dicta of a Chapter 7 case that “in the case of a
Chapter 11 trustee, the court should follow § 330(a)(7) and calculate the commission
pursuant to the formula in § 326. Then, the court should adjust the commission by applying
the § 330(a)(3) factors.”).
309
In re Marvel Entm’t Grp., Inc., 234 B.R. at 41.
310
See, e.g., In re Fleming Companies, Inc., 304 B.R. 85, 89 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003)
(stating that “the Bankruptcy Court has an independent duty to review fee requests of all
professionals retained in a [c]hapter 11 case to assure that the services rendered were
necessary and appropriate and that the fees requested are reasonable”) (citation omitted); In
re Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 19 F.3d 833, 844 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that the court
“must protect the estate, lest overreaching attorneys or other professionals drain it of wealth
304
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2. Metric Assessment
Trustee compensation is structured with a clear nexus to the trustee’s
legal duty and scale of work. The compensation ceiling formula depends on
achievement of the trustee’s legal mandate—payment to creditors—rather
than the size of the company. This incentivizes trustees to avoid waste and
furthers the policy purpose of the statute. In the charity context, an
equivalent approach may be to link the compensation ceiling to the
organization’s charitable expenditures. This metric, which includes most
administrative and fundraising costs of operating charitable programs, 311 is
already used to determine the maximum allowable amount that charities
may spend on lobbying activities,312 and could feasibly transfer to the
compensation context as well.
Applying the trustee compensation model to the charitable sector
would nevertheless be inapt in certain respects. First, beneath the formulabased ceiling, trustee compensation is fixed by a judge according to market
rate. As discussed in Part V, the market-rate standard is helpful in attracting
qualified professionals, but can facilitate inflation when insiders perform
the benchmarking rather than independent judges. Second, while the
respective legal mandates of bankruptcy trustees and charity executives
have similarities, expenditures are a stronger proxy for trustee performance
than charity executive performance. Charity executives are expected to
build the long-term financial health of their organization and achieve an
efficient charitable impact. This may involve trimming expenses, growing
reserves in anticipation of economic downturns, and pursuing cost-effective
programming, all of which may be discouraged under a system that pegged
allowable executive compensation to expenditures. A formula-based
ceiling may, in short, create incentives antithetical to responsible charity
stewardship.313

which by right should inure to the benefit of unsecured creditors”).
311
I.R.C. § 4911(e)(1) (defining “exempt purpose expenditures” for the purpose of
calculating the allowable level of lobbying expenses); Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-4 (elaborating
upon the meaning of “exempt purpose expenditures”). The exempt expenditures formula
includes compensation amounts but not lobbying expenditures; this may need to be inverted
in an exempt expenditures formula for the purpose of determining the compensation ceiling.
312
I.R.C. § 4911(c)(2) (permitting charities to spend up to a certain percentage of their
“exempt purpose expenditures” on lobbying without incurring a penalty tax).
313
While charity mismanagement is socially sub-optimal, it would not necessarily
undermine the policy purpose of the charitable tax exemption. Eligibility for exemption
depends on whether an organization operates for exempt purposes, not whether it operates
efficiently or sustainably. Nevertheless, at a certain point, profligacy in furtherance of a
higher executive salary must surely contravene the requirements of Section 501(c)(3).
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C. Potential Synthesis and Further Investigation
The compensation frameworks for federal employees and bankruptcy
trustees both offer transferable elements that could enhance the metric for
reasonable compensation in the charitable sector. The federal employee
scale provides an analytically sound analogue to the charitable sector, as
both are subsidized by taxes in order to provide socially beneficial outputs.
The most salient weakness of the analogue, the relative security of federal
employment vis-à-vis the private sector, can be measured and incorporated
into the scale. The trustee framework contributes the notion of a formulabased rather than fixed-ceiling. This acknowledges the variance in
responsibility and complexity in organizations of different sizes and
provides an opportunity to link compensation to the furtherance of
charitable purposes, albeit at the risk of introducing incentives for
suboptimal management.
A synthesis of these strengths might be a graduated scale of ceilings
for tax-advantaged compensation based on charitable expenditures.
Ceilings could be determined with reference to federal compensation
levels, plus a risk premium. For example, an organization with large
charitable expenditures may have a ceiling based on Level 1 Senior
Executive Service pay (including the value of federal benefits), while an
organization with smaller expenditures may have a ceiling based on Level
2. Charitable expenditures could be defined to exclude executive
compensation amounts themselves, so that high compensation could not
serve as its own justification. The relevant expenditure level could be
averaged over several years so that executives are not penalized for saving
funds or unduly rewarded for high spending in any given year. A graduated
scale is normatively superior to the current ceiling, as it would link taxadvantaged compensation to: (1) the policy objectives of Section 501(c)(3)
status; and (2) public-sector compensation, which is similarly taxpayerfunded. It also offers the practical benefit of capturing excessive
compensation below the $1 million mark.
While such reform may hold promise for the charitable sector, the
history of unintended consequences from compensation reform reinforces
the need for further investigation. Relevant questions include (1) whether
the TCJA excise tax successfully curtails charity compensation or
reproduces the effects of Section 162(m) (i.e., a rise in compensation
towards the $1 million ceiling, a willingness to absorb the tax
consequences, etc.); (2) whether the removal of the loophole for
performance-based compensation under Section 162(m) somehow tames
excessive compensation in public companies; and (3) whether the I.R.S.’s
analytics-based targeting initiative succeeds in identifying noncompliant
charities. The outcomes of these policy changes may have implications for
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the viability and optimal design of the regulatory enforcement action
mechanism and the excise tax mechanism. It would also be valuable to
determine the effects of State-imposed limitations on charity compensation,
thought these are currently few. Finally, there is the open question of
whether boards can be relied upon to police the organization’s finances
such that an expenditure-based formula would be unlikely to jeopardize
long-term financial health. Resolving these questions would be instructive
in the redesign of executive compensation in the charitable sector.
VIII. CONCLUSION
While the TCJA excise tax provides a promising step forward, the
oversight framework for charity executive compensation remains poorly
tailored to the goals of charitable tax status. The underlying policy purpose
of Section 501(c)(3) is to subsidize, through tax exemption and deductible
contributions, private organizations that provide charitable outputs without
diverting resources to private hands. Current law imposes only piecemeal
accountability on charities that are targeted for scrutiny by the media, are
individually examined by the I.R.S., or pay over $1 million to their top
executives. The TCJA excise tax mechanism strikes an appropriate balance
between enforcing the policy purpose of Section 501(c)(3) and preserving
charity discretion. By improving the metric for appropriate compensation,
the excise tax could provide accountability to taxpayers and restore
confidence in the charitable sector. A graduated scale of compensation
ceilings tied to public-sector salaries and charitable expenditures could
provide normative and practical advantages over the existing metric, but
reform efforts should be informed by further research regarding, among
other things, the effects of the TCJA and I.R.S. enforcement innovations.

